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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

A CHANGING OF THE GUARD: THE PROPRIETY OF APPOINTING
GUARDIANS FOR FETUSES
Close to thirty years after Roe v. Wade,1 Jean Reith Schroedel wrote,
“[r]egardless of the specific policy, the fundamental dilemma remains
balancing the rights of the fetus and the rights of the pregnant woman. . . .
While Roe, perhaps unwittingly, began the balancing act between the woman
and the fetus, subsequent cases permanently fixed it in the legal debate.”2
Schroedel’s assessment of the “balancing” involved in fetal rights law and
policy is increasingly evidenced by judicial and legislative efforts to extend
legal rights to fetuses, including those areas of law in which the fetus’s rights
conflict with the rights of the mother.3 Many oppose increased fetal rights in
any context, arguing that independent legal status for fetuses “diminishes a
woman’s rights, creating a continuous ‘slippery slope’ of state intervention into
women’s lives.”4 Cynthia Daniels writes that the notion that the fetus has
rights “has generated a deep crisis . . . which throws into question women’s
rights to self-sovereignty, to work, and to due process under the law . . . and
one that suggests the tenuous nature of women’s hold on liberal citizenship.”5
By contrast, those in favor of fetal rights argue that Roe’s holding does not

1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. JEAN REITH SCHROEDEL, IS THE FETUS A PERSON? A COMPARISON OF POLICIES
ACROSS THE FIFTY STATES 44-45 (2000).
3. For example, the extension of personhood status to the fetus in wrongful death tort cases
has, in Schroedel’s view, “contributed to the trend of viewing the fetus as a person with
independent rights in civil law.” Id. at 174. Fetal rights have also expanded in criminal homicide
law and in the prosecutions of mothers for prenatal substance abuse during pregnancy. Id. at 105106, 137. However, courts extending such rights to fetuses in non-abortion contexts are careful to
deny any implications for Roe’s holding that a fetus is not a person for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. For example, the Mississippi Supreme Court recently held that the term “person” in
the Mississippi wrongful death statute includes a “quick” fetus. 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker,
853 So. 2d 104, 112 (Miss. 2003). The court offered assurance that Roe “is not implicated here”
because the mother’s fundamental right to privacy is not involved when considering a third
party’s negligence. Id. at 113-14.
4. SCHROEDEL, supra note 1, at 44. See also Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions &
Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9 (1987); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts With Women’s Constitutional Rights to
Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599 (1986).
5. CYNTHIA R. DANIELS, AT WOMEN’S EXPENSE: STATE POWER AND THE POLITICS OF
FETAL RIGHTS 1 (1993). Daniels goes on to say that many challenge the expansion of fetal rights
as “yet another attempt to reinstate social domination over women.” Id. at 3.
1419
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preclude states from recognizing and protecting the legal interests of fetuses
outside the abortion context.6 They also argue that advancing medical
technology, which increasingly reveals the independent humanity of the
unborn, provides tangible evidence of a protectible human being prior to birth.7
When the abortion right is at issue, States cannot legally extend rights per
se to fetuses but have a recognized interest from conception in protecting
potential human life under the Supreme Court’s 1992 decision Planned
Parenthood v. Casey.8 In that case, the Court held that States may protect this
interest by regulating abortion at any point in pregnancy, so long as the
regulation does not place an undue burden on the woman’s right to choose.9
Thus, while a woman’s right to a pre-viability abortion remained intact after
Casey, the undue burden test gave more weight to the State’s interest than had
Roe and required a more significant showing to invalidate an abortion
regulation.10 The result has been a balancing of conflicting rights in abortion
and non-abortion situations, sometimes a conflict that is between the fetus’s
rights and the mother’s rights and sometimes between the State’s interest in the
fetus and the mother’s rights.
A relatively recent question in this balancing act has been whether a court
may properly appoint a guardian for a fetus in various court proceedings.
Representative types of cases in which guardians are sought or appointed
include “forced medical treatment cases, []cases involving allegations of
substance abuse during pregnancy,” and abortion cases.11 There is, however,
no consensus as to whether and in what situations such an appointment is
proper. For example, in Alabama, courts have allowed a guardian for the fetus
during proceedings in which a minor seeks a judicial bypass of parental
6. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness & Susan K. Pritchard, To Be or Not To Be: Protecting
The Unborn’s Potentiality of Life, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (arguing that some courts under Roe
have incorrectly applied the denial of personhood under the Fourteenth Amendment to nonabortion contexts). See also Charles I. Lugosi, Respecting Human Life in 21st Century America:
A Moral Perspective to Extend Civil Rights to the Unborn from Creation to Natural Death, 48 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 425 (2004).
7. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 4-5. It is worth noting that both pro-life and pro-abortion
advocates see granting fetuses rights outside of abortion as logically suspect. Those who favor
abortion rights believe that any fetal rights ultimately threaten the right to abortion, and should be
opposed. Those against abortion argue that the growing trend towards fetal rights is one of the
reasons to call into question the continued recognition of the abortion right. See DANIELS, supra
note 5, at 3-4. Both sides recognize the difficulty in maintaining the analytical distinction
between fetal rights when abortion is at issue and when it is not.
8. 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
9. Id. at 878.
10. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436, 443 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting that one
of Casey’s goals was “restor[ing] a balance of interests between women seeking abortions and
states seeking to regulate abortions by reasserting the importance of the states’ interests”).
11. Susan Goldberg, Of Gametes and Guardians: The Impropriety of Appointing Guardians
Ad Litem For Fetuses and Embryos, 66 WASH. L. REV. 503, 521 (1991).
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consent to have an abortion.12 By contrast, the Florida Supreme Court has held
such an appointment in a similar situation “clearly improper.”13 Justifications
for allowing the appointments center on either the need to protect the rights of
the fetus in non-abortion related proceedings,14 or the need to protect the
State’s interest in the potential life of the fetus in abortion related
proceedings.15 By contrast, opponents of guardian appointments argue that
guardianship statutes do not make provision for appointment of a fetal
guardian, and thus the appointment is statutorily improper.16 Others argue that
as a practical matter, a guardian would have difficulty ascertaining the best
interests of a fetus without resorting to personal moral judgments.
Furthermore, they contend that the appointment creates an adversarial
relationship between the woman and fetus that is “ultimately inimical to the
promotion of the interests of both woman and fetus.”17 Finally, opponents of
guardians for fetuses contend that such an appointment strikes at the heart of
the right of a woman to choose abortion by tacitly—and improperly under
current law—recognizing the fetus as a “person” and placing an undue burden
on women.18 These are the basic contours of the arguments in what some have
called the “wave of the future” in abortion regulations.19
This Comment will argue that appointing guardians for fetuses in court
proceedings involving a “maternal-fetal” conflict is necessary and proper under
12. In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 500 (Ala. 1998) (holding that a guardian did not have
a statutory right to appeal but nowhere indicating that such appointment was improper). By 2001
in Alabama, there had been at least seventeen instances in which minors seeking to waive
parental consent had been questioned by an appointed representative of the fetus. Helena
Silverstein, In The Matter of Anonymous, A Minor: Fetal Representation in Hearings to Waive
Parental Consent For Abortion, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 69, 87 (2001).
13. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1190 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for the fetus was “clearly improper,” but offering no reasoning for its decision
on that issue).
14. See Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 503. Here, the dissent argued that Rule 17(c) of the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, which historically had been applied to protect the property
interests of the unborn and also had been used in divorce proceedings, ought to be used to require
the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the fetus in judicial bypass proceedings. Id. at 501-02.
According to the rule “[w]hen the interest of an infant unborn or unconceived is before the court,
the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for such interest.” Id. at 499 n.2 (alteration in original).
15. See Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Right to Life, Inc., et. al. at 1, In re Guardianship of
J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921). See also Silverstein, supra
note 12, at 91-110 (arguing that appointment of guardians in parental consent waiver hearings for
minors passes constitutional muster under Casey, but that such a conclusion evidences Casey’s
“serious shortcomings” ).
16. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
17. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 544.
18. See Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU, et. al. at 2, In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864
So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921) (arguing that a fetus is not a person within
the meaning of Florida’s guardianship statutes, and therefore appointment is improper).
19. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 89 (quoting pro-life advocate Julian McPhillips).
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current law.20 It is important to note at the outset that the argument will
proceed along two distinct lines of analysis, one considering the question when
abortion is not at issue and the other when abortion is at issue. This Comment
will argue that the rights and interests directly attributable to the fetus form the
primary justification for guardianship appointments in non-abortion contexts,
and the State interest articulated in Casey forms the primary justification in
abortion contexts. In non-abortion contexts, fetal guardians are proper as the
procedural means by which to protect a fetal right before the court. These
normally take the form of 1) a grant by the state of fetal personhood; 2) a legal
interest in beginning life with sound mind and free from harm; or, more
indirectly, 3) a state interest in protecting the fetus from harm. As a procedural
mechanism, the propriety of a guardian appointment is a distinct question from
the propriety of the underlying substantive right or interest that it must protect.
It is legitimized by or derives from either the prior existence of the right or a
court’s consideration of the right.21 In short, if there is a protectible right or
interest properly before a court, the State has a parens patriae duty to protect
that right or interest, and a guardian for the fetus is the appropriate means to do
so.22
In abortion contexts, fetal guardians are proper as the means to protect the
State’s interest in the potential life of the unborn and do not, under current
federal constitutional jurisprudence, constitute an undue burden on the
woman’s right to choose abortion.23 The Comment does not contend that
under current law a fetus can have substantive legal rights that conflict with its
mother’s right to have an abortion such that increasing fetal rights outside the
abortion context somehow “overflow” to legitimize guardianships in abortion
situations. Instead, the argument will be limited to applying the Casey
standard to guardianship appointments. Thus, whether the interest at stake is

20. I use “maternal-fetal” conflict broadly here to encompass any court proceeding in which
a mother’s choice (e.g., to use illegal drugs) conflicts with what is arguably in the best interest of
the fetus (e.g., to be free from beginning life addicted to drugs).
21. The interest at stake when the question of a right or legal status is before the court, where
the State has yet to decide whether to extend the right or status to the fetus, is that the outcome of
the litigation will either lead to a recognized right or it will not. Thus, the fetus has a protectible
future interest in the outcome of the litigation, or, at the very least, the State has an interest in
seeing that its interest in potential life is fairly represented at the proceeding. See more detailed
discussion of this issue infra at 21-24.
22. The Comment will argue throughout Part II that the fact of such protectible rights is an
increasing reality in many states.
23. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (stating that the “State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the
life of the fetus that may become a child”). For the record, the author is of the opinion that Roe,
and by extension Casey insofar as it reaffirms Roe, was wrongly decided and that a fetus should
have the protected rights of a constitutional person. However, the Comment argues in Part III
that notwithstanding this denial of personhood, a fetus deserves the protection of a guardian.
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imputed to the fetus (in non-abortion contexts) or the State (in abortion
contexts), the result is a need to protect the interest before the court through
appointment of a fetal guardian.
Part I will discuss the theory and purposes of appointing guardians,
including the source of a court’s authority to appoint guardians and its
connection to the State’s parens patriae duty. Part II will give a general
history of fetal rights law and discuss those rights in cases of prenatal
substance abuse and forced medical treatment cases generally, as well as in the
few cases that consider the appointment of guardians. Part II will also offer
analysis and conclusions regarding the propriety and appointment of guardians
in these contexts. Part III will discuss Casey and subsequent “undue burden”
jurisprudence, analyze abortion related cases involving appointments of
guardians for fetuses, and argue that such appointments pass the Casey “undue
burden” standard. Parts II and III will also discuss the primary arguments
offered against appointing guardians.
I. A PRELIMINARY MATTER: THE PURPOSE AND FUNCTION OF A GUARDIAN
While the law governing guardianships historically did not contemplate
fetuses, the question for the purpose of this Comment is whether the principles
underlying court-appointed guardians are properly applicable to fetuses in the
context of their expanding legal rights and in the context of the State’s
recognized interest in protecting them. The appointment of guardians for
minors has its roots in property law.24 Because minors “[were] presumed [to
be] wanting in discretion to manage their own causes, or to appoint and
instruct attorneys . . . it [became] the duty of courts, in order to preserve their
property from destruction or waste, to appoint a guardian to take care of it
pending the proceedings.”25 The State was seen to have a general right as
“‘pater patriae’ to interfere in particular cases, for the benefit of such who are
incapable to protect themselves.”26 This duty of the state continues to exist in
cases “where a potential conflict exists between the usual decisionmaker and
the individual whose interests are at stake.”27 In the Twentieth Century, the
guardian has been described as serving a dual function related to the state and
to the child. The first and most “direct” function is in the relation between the
guardian and his ward.28 The second role is as “trustee of the state’s interests
24. J. G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS
1 (1897).
25. Id. at 63. Another author writing in the mid-1900s said that this duty of the court arises
because the child is not a juridical person and thus has no standing in court if he sues or is sued
without a guardian. RICHARD V. MACKAY, GUARDIANSHIP AND THE PROTECTION OF INFANTS
(LAW FOR THE PARENT AND GUARDIAN) 13 (1948).
26. Id. at 2 (quoting Lord Hardwicke, speaking of the High Court of Chancery).
27. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 505.
28. HASSELTINE BYRD TAYLOR, LAW OF GUARDIAN AND WARD 5 (1935).
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in the ward” and as such, the guardian is the “actual” protector on behalf of the
“metaphysical entity” of the state.29
The type of guardian appointed in a court proceeding is a guardian ad
litem, “whose duty it is to bring the rights of the infant to the notice of the
court.”30 The power to appoint such a guardian is “inherent in every court.”31
Historically, it was the duty of the court to see that the guardian ad litem made
a proper defense of its ward and did not “surrender the rights” of the ward.32
The state had an obligation to intervene “when it perceive[d] that a parent has
acted in a manner that contravenes the state’s protective obligations.”33 Today,
such protective obligations often arise by statute in situations of suspected
child abuse or neglect, as well as in response to allegations of medical neglect
or withholding of medical treatment.34 The question for this Comment is
whether these traditional rules of guardianship appointments are applicable to a
fetus, either to protect its own interests or the State’s interests. Indeed, Susan
Goldberg has argued that they are not applicable but bases this contention on
the fact that “[c]urrent legal theories do not accord to the fetus or embryo the
status and legal protections afforded to children.”35 Contrary to Goldberg’s
assertion, the law in fact does accord the fetus many legal protections that are
within constitutional bounds and does recognize a State interest in the fetus.
As a result, the traditional rules of guardianship appointments are applicable to
fetuses.
Prior to examining particular situations in which guardianship
appointments arise, two objections of general application should be discussed.
First, a common argument is that, absent a state statute authorizing
appointment of a guardian for a fetus, a court has no power to make the

29. Id. In Taylor’s view, this second function has not been generally recognized, but its
importance is “fundamental.” Id. Taylor reasons that the responsibility of the state for all children
is a long-established responsibility, and that as such, the state must be conscientious in its
appointment and monitoring of guardians. Id.
30. WOERNER, supra note 24, at 64.
31. Id. A guardian ad litem is “appointed by the court to appear in a lawsuit on behalf of an
incompetent or minor party.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 713 (7th ed. 1999). According to
Susan Goldberg, the role of the guardian ad litem is distinguishable from the role of an advocate.
“The guardian ad litem represents the best interests of the individual, regardless of the
individual’s preferences. An advocate . . . is a proponent of the individual’s point of view.”
Goldberg, supra note 11, at 505 n.2.
32. WOERNER, supra note 24, at 71. In exercising this protection on behalf of minors, the
courts did not wish to contravene the rights of parents and normally would only appoint a
guardian if the parents were dead or declared unfit to have custody of their children. Id. at 90-91.
33. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 507.
34. Id. at 508.
35. Id. at 504.
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appointment.36 However, as the brief history above indicates, courts have long
had an inherent power to appoint guardians absent statutory authority when the
court identifies a protectible right before it.37 Second, some have argued that a
guardianship appointment is improper because it “creates” an adversarial
relationship between the mother and the fetus.38 However, as will be discussed
in more detail below, it is the substantive right or interest that the guardian is
charged with protecting that creates an adversarial relationship between mother
and fetus. While a court proceeding may involve a guardian “confronting” the
pregnant mother, such confrontation merely constitutes a necessary function of
the court in discharging its “rights protecting” duty and does not itself create
the maternal-fetal conflict. While one may argue for the impropriety or
unconstitutionality of the right or State interest that triggers the appointment,
the cause of the adversity is antecedent to the appointment and functioning of
the guardian. Third, many argue that the fetus is not a legal “person” and
therefore cannot be a “ward.” The short answer to this objection, which will
be discussed further below, is that in the limited historical use of guardians for
fetuses, a guardian has been deemed appropriate so long as the fetus has a
protectible interest, notwithstanding a lack of legal personhood.39 We now
turn to an examination of the history and current state of substantive rights
being granted to fetuses.
II. FETAL RIGHTS IN NON-ABORTION CONTEXTS: A GROWING TREND
A.

The Development of Fetal Rights With Respect to Third Parties

While fetal rights with respect to third parties do not occasion the need for
a court appointed guardian, the history of these rights is crucial to
understanding the current extensions of fetal rights. According to Cynthia
Daniels, the earliest fetal rights case was Dietrich v. Northampton,40 in which a
pregnant mother miscarried her four to five month old fetus after a fall

36. See In re Guardianship of J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(offering the absence of a provision for fetuses in the state statute governing guardian
appointments as one of its reasons for refusing to appoint a guardian).
37. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. See also Goldberg, supra note 11, at 506
(stating that “[c]ourts derive authority to appoint guardians ad litem from statutory provisions,
procedural rules and their own inherent equity power”).
38. See Goldberg, supra note 11, at 528. In the context of the recent Florida case, the
executive director of the ACLU of Florida said, “[w]hen you set up a guardian for a fetus, you’re
creating a situation with the mother and the fetus having competing legal rights.” Abby
Goodnough, No Guardian for a Fetus, Court Rules, at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/11/
national/11FLOR.html?pagew (Jan. 11, 2004).
39. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973). See also, MACKAY, supra note 25, at 13.
40. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 10 (citing 138 Mass. 14 (1884)).
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resulting from a defect in the town highway.41 Oliver Wendell Holmes denied
the mother damages in tort because the fetus was “part of the mother at the
time of the injury” and not a person recognized by law as having standing in
courts.42 This view of the fetus held sway until, in 1887, a state court granted
fetuses limited rights to inherit property even when the benefactor died prior to
the birth of the fetus.43
In 1946, the court in Bonbrest v. Kotz allowed recovery for fetal harm
caused by a doctor’s negligence during delivery.44 While this case extended
the rights of a fetus to in utero injuries, the holding was limited to postviability injuries, and recovery was contingent upon the subsequent birth of the
child.45 This post-viability limitation fell in the context of tort law in 1953
when a New York court held that a child, born alive, may recover for prenatal

41. Id. at 14-15.
42. Id. at 17.
43. RACHEL ROTH, MAKING WOMEN PAY: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF FETAL RIGHTS 20
(2000). In American law, fetuses have been accorded their most significant and long-standing
protections in the area of property law. At common law, a life in being existed from the moment
of conception and the actual right to inherit was contingent upon live birth. Goldberg, supra note
11, at 517. Goldberg argues that the rationale for this protection was not the legal status of the
fetus but rather the protection of the presumed intentions of the testator and a limitation on the
harsh application of the rule against perpetuities. Id. See also Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to
Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women’s Live After Webster, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
179, 186-87 (1989). The author stated:
Legal recognition of the fetus first occurred in narrow, specifically identified contexts
under tort and probate law to advance specific purposes that do not depend on a particular
moral view of the fetus’ value and do not create legal conflicts with pregnant women. . . .
...
. . . [and] were applied solely in ways consistent with and supportive of the interests of
pregnant women.
Id.
44. 65 F.Supp. 138, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1946).
45. The born-alive rule stood for the proposition that unless a child was born alive, the
ostensible right connected to prenatal injury did not attach or come to fruition. Aaron Wagner,
Comment, Texas Two-Step: Serving Up Fetal Rights By Side-Stepping Roe v. Wade has Set the
Table for Another Showdown on Fetal Personhood in Texas and Beyond, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV.
1085, 1100 (2001). The English common law described the rule as follows:
If a woman be quick with child, and by a potion or otherwise killeth it in her wombe, or if
a man beat her, whereby the child dyeth in her body, and she is delivered a dead child,
this is a great misprision, and no murder; but if the child be born and dyeth of the potion,
battery, or other cause, this is murder; for in the law it is accounted a reasonable creature,
in rerum natura, when it is born alive.
Id. (quoting 3 SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES 58 (1648)). By contrast, a “viability” view holds
that some level of fetal rights attach when the fetus is capable of independent existence outside
the womb, whether or not the fetus is subsequently born alive. Id. at 1102. Today, most states
have abandoned the born-alive rule in favor of the theory of viability as the appropriate measure
for granting the fetus rights. Id.
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injury caused by a third party’s negligence at any time at or after conception.46
While cases like this extended protection to the fetus from conception, the
born-alive rule created a certain anomaly, namely that a woman whose fetus
sustained injuries from a beating of the woman could recover damages so long
as the child was born with those injuries but could recover nothing if the fetus
died in utero from the injuries.47 This problem led to an increase in advocacy
for abolition of the born-alive rule and for greater protection for the fetus in
utero, and, in 1984, Massachusetts affirmed the personhood of a fetus who died
from injuries in a car accident.48 In the subsequent history of tort law, some
states have extended full rights of persons to fetuses from conception. For
example, in 1995 the Missouri Supreme Court declared that its “legislature
[had] intended the courts to interpret ‘person’ within [its] wrongful death
statute to . . . [include] a claim for the wrongful death of [an] unborn child,
even prior to viability.”49 In 2003, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that
the state wrongful death statute included a non-viable fetus who is “quick” in
the womb.50 As support for the conclusion, the court cited the state’s general
public and social policy of protecting life.51
Fetuses have also enjoyed increased protection from third-party harm
under criminal homicide laws. The case law and statutes that apply to fetuses
can be “classified according to whether they accord the fetus no independent
46. Kelly v. Gregory, 125 N.Y.S.2d 696, 698 (N.Y. 1953). Other states soon followed suit.
See, e.g., Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 93 S.E.2d 727 (Ga. 1956); Bennett v. Hymers,
147 A.2d 108 (N.H. 1958); Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497 (N.J. 1960). Daniels points out that
the court’s statement in Brennan that “the child has a legal right to begin life with a sound mind
and body,” used to affirm the right of the child to sue for third party damages also affirmed the
more general “right of the child to be protected from negligence or harm in utero.” DANIELS,
supra note 5, at 12. This language laid the groundwork for later expansion of fetal rights beyond
injuries caused by third parties. Id.
47. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 14.
48. Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (Mass. 1984). According to Daniels,
the 1980s was a decade of unprecedented extension of fetal rights as the fetus increasingly came
to be viewed as a tiny “person” within the body of the pregnant woman. DANIELS, supra note 5,
at 9. This expansion of fetal rights coincided with the technological ability to see the fetus in its
human form ever earlier in pregnancy, thereby buttressing the argument for distinct legal rights.
Id. at 10.
49. Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89, 92 (Mo. 1995). See also Strzelczyk v.
Jett, 870 P.2d 730 (Mont. 1994); Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996);
Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. Ct. App. 1995). But see Coveleski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d
608, 610 (Pa. 1993) (rejecting a cause of action for wrongful death on behalf of a non-viable
fetus); LaDu v. Oregon Clinic, P.C., 998 P.2d 733, 738 (Or. Ct. App. 2000) (en banc) (holding
that a non-viable fetus was not a person under state wrongful death statute).
50. 66 Fed. Credit Union v. Tucker, 853 So. 2d 104, 112 (Miss. 2003). According to the
court, every jurisdiction in the country as of the date of their decision allowed recovery for
prenatal injuries when a child is born alive, and six states allowed recovery for a non-viable fetus
that dies while still in the womb. Id. at 107.
51. Id. at 113.
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value, some independent value but less than personhood status, or full
personhood status.”52 According to Americans United For Life, twenty-seven
states currently treat the killing of a fetus as a form of homicide.53 For
example, in 1990 the Supreme Court of Minnesota declared constitutional a
statute designating as first-degree murder the premeditated intentional killing
of an unborn child.54 In 1994, California’s Supreme Court held that viability
was not a necessary element of fetal murder, thereby extending its fetal murder
statute to include any fetus beyond the embryonic stage of development.55 As
recently as 2003, the Supreme Court of Arkansas denied postconviction relief
to a defendant convicted under the state’s Fetal Protection Act, which defined a
person under the state’s homicide statute to include a fetus beyond twelve
weeks development.56 At the federal level, the Unborn Victims of Violence
Act was signed into law on April 1, 2004, making it a separate offense under
federal law to kill an unborn child.57 As states and the federal government
have extended rights to fetuses vis-à-vis third parties, they have been careful to
note that the extension does not implicate the constitutional right to an
abortion.58 However, the question whether states could or would extend rights
to fetuses when those rights might conflict with the mother in non-abortion
contexts remained unanswered.
B.

From Third Parties to Mothers
1.

Fetal Rights in Prenatal Substance Abuse Cases

a.

Is there a Fetal Right?

As the extension of rights to fetuses with respect to harm caused by third
parties progressed, the states also began to recognize fetal rights vis-à-vis the
mother. The seeds of this extension were sown in part by the language of
earlier tort cases attributing to the fetus a “legal right to begin life with a sound
mind and body” and by increasingly viewing the fetus as distinct from the

52. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 13.
53. Americans United for Life, States that Prohibit Crimes Against the Unborn, available at
http://www.unitedforlife.org/guides/fh/fh_statutes.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2004) (providing
specific statutory references and cases interpreting those references). According to The Alan
Guttmacher Institute, there are twenty-nine states in which at least one section of the state’s
homicide statute includes a fetus as a victim at some point in gestation. The Alan Guttmacher
Institute, available at http://www.agi-usa.org/.
54. State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990).
55. People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).
56. Beulah v. State, 101 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Ark. 2003).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1841.
58. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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mother.59 “As the language of the law shifted attention from the loss
experienced by the parent or parents to the loss ‘experienced’ by the fetus”
efforts increased to protect the fetus from harmful action taken by the mother.60
This protection came primarily in the form of applying prenatal child abuse
statutes to the fetus in cases of mothers’ prenatal substance abuse.61 The 1980s
saw the most significant increase in prosecutions for the use of narcotics by
pregnant women, but such efforts date back to as early as 1969 when a New
York trial court held that a mother’s narcotic addiction created a presumption
of child abuse.62 In 1974, another New York court held that withdrawal
symptoms in a newborn constituted prima facie evidence of prenatal neglect.63
Not all jurisdictions followed New York’s lead. In 1977, a California
appellate court declined to extend the meaning of the word “child” as used in
the California Penal Code to protect twin fetuses from their mother’s addiction
to heroin.64 Three years later, however, a Michigan appellate court held that a
newborn suffering narcotics withdrawal symptoms as a result of prenatal drug
abuse may be considered a neglected child within the jurisdiction of the
probate court.65 Similarly, in 1985 a New York court again declared that “a
finding that a child is a ‘neglected child’ may be predicated solely upon
prenatal conduct by the mother” and the unborn child “may be considered a
person, in order to receive the protection of [the Family Court] act.”66 The
59. See supra notes 46 and 48 and accompanying text.
60. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 15. In addition to the language of cases such as
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984), rapid advances in fetal imaging
technology and in physicians’ ability to treat fetuses directly as patients contributed to the view
that fetuses were persons with an existence separate from their mothers. Id. at 18-19. Rachel
Roth, in opposing efforts to create new feticide laws to further punish criminals for harm to
fetuses, recognizes the inevitable, and in her view unwanted, extension of these rights. “There is
no reason to think that the creation of rights for fetuses can be contained in this one realm,
without potentially adverse effects on women, especially if the laws are not written explicitly to
exempt pregnant women from their reach.” ROTH, supra note 43, at 12.
61. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 105-109.
62. Id. at 49; See also In re John Children, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1969).
63. In re Vanessa F., 351 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct. 1974).
64. Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 21-19 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (justifying
holding in part on the fact that other areas of the California criminal code and the Supreme Court
in Roe had refused to recognize a fetus as a human being or person). See also In re Steven S. 126
Cal. App. 3d 23, 29-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that a fetus would not be protected under
child neglect laws); Dittrick Infant v. Dittrick, 263 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Mich. Ct. App. 1977)
(declining to apply the meaning of “child” to a fetus).
65. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736, 739 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
66. In re Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). The Act’s language,
as quoted by the court, defined a neglected child as:
. . . a child less than eighteen years of age
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent
danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent . . . to exercise a
minimum degree of care
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court agreed with the contention that Roe v. Wade should not divest “the states
of the power to grant legal recognition to the unborn in non-14th Amendment
situations.”67 Using more “state interest” centered reasoning, in 1989 a
California appellate court held that a petition to protect a newborn child from
prenatal drug abuse would be upheld because of the State’s significant interest
in protecting already born babies from the ill-effects of prenatal drug abuse.68
Thus, at the appellate court level, several states have been willing to grant a
fetus rights in the face of a mother’s prenatal substance abuse.
In spite of the number of appellate courts willing to recognize fetal rights
in this area, no state supreme court was willing to uphold convictions for
prenatal substance abuse under existing child abuse laws until the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Whitner v. State.69 Taking a
strongly fetus-centered approach, the court concluded that a fetus is a person
under the South Carolina Children’s Code by analogizing the case with recent
South Carolina cases that had recognized a viable fetus as a person under
wrongful death and criminal statutes.70 Such precedent led the court to say that
“it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of
homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for purposes of statutes
proscribing child abuse.”71 The court argued that the protection of fetuses in
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter . . . or medical . . . care,
though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so; or
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, . . . by misusing
alcoholic beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions; or by any other
acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the aid of the court . . .
Id. at 333 (alteration in original).
67. Id. at 334 (quoting John E.B. Myers, Abuse and Neglect of the Unborn: Can the State
Intervene? 23 DUQ. L REV. 1, 15 (1984)).
68. Troy D. v. Kelly D., 215 Cal. App. 3d 889, 898 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). See also, In re
Stefanel Tyesha C., 157 A.D.2d 322, 330-331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (finding of child neglect
against a mother for prenatal substance abuse was predicated upon the State’s interest in
preventing newborn children from the significant ill-effects of prenatal drug abuse and from the
probability that the mother could not care for the child after birth).
69. 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997). Prior to Whitner, the supreme courts of Florida, Kentucky,
Nevada, and Ohio had all overturned convictions of women prosecuted under child abuse statutes
for drug abuse during pregnancy. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 53.
70. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779-780. Section 20-7-50 of the Code provides:
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person, who shall, without
lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as defined in § 20-7-490, the proper care and
attention for such child or helpless person, so that the life, health or comfort of such child
or helpless person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor and shall be punished within the discretion of the circuit court.
Id. at 779 (emphasis omitted).
71. Id. at 780. This language in the court’s opinion extending rights to the fetus by analogy
from a third-party context to the fetus/mother relationship is, according to abortion advocates,
simply a step away from proclaiming fetal rights in the abortion context. For an excellent survey
of inconsistencies in fetal rights law and a contention that this is precisely the issue facing
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these areas was justifiable not only “for the sake of its mother or both its
parents,” but rather because of the State’s interest in the life of a fetus and in
the protection of the fetus itself.72 In addition,
It strains belief for Whitner to argue that using crack cocaine during pregnancy
is encompassed within the constitutionally recognized right of privacy. Use of
crack cocaine is illegal, period. . . . We do not see how the fact of pregnancy
elevates the use of crack cocaine to the lofty status of a fundamental right.73

Since Whitner, a New York appellate court has decided a substance abuse
case using similar reasoning, and South Carolina has reaffirmed Whitner.74 In
the New York case, the court rejected the argument that a lack of constitutional
“legal personality” precluded New York from extending legal personality
under a New York child neglect statute.75 The court noted that New York
courts have “demonstrated concern and consideration with regard to protecting
the unborn child or fetus” as reflected in homicide laws, legislative protection
for the unborn in property disposition and tort law, and the State’s construal of
a fetus as a medical patient.76 Thus, “surely [the law] may be found to
encompass protection of the fetus from intentional acts by its mother, which
acts could cause the child to begin life in an impaired condition.”77

abortion rights advocates see Wagner, supra note 45, at 1123-1125. “[T]his comment suggests
for pro-lifers and pro-choicers alike that, if Roe v. Wade is going to fall, it will be through the
recognition of fetal personhood and the inconsistencies that have come from treating a fetus
differently under the law depending on the circumstances.” Id. at 1086.
72. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783.
73. Id. at 786. In reaching its holding the court recognized and distinguished the “many”
decisions from other state courts that did not allow criminal prosecution under similar state
statutes but concluded that “both statutory language and case law compel the conclusion we
reach.” Id. at 784. For criticism of the Whitner decision, see Alma Tolliver, Note, Child Abuse
Statute Expanded to Protect the Viable Fetus: The Abusive Effects of South Carolina’s
Interpretation of the Word “Child”, 24 S. ILL. U. L.J. 383, 400-03 (2000) (arguing, inter alia, that
the Whitner court created new law and that the resolution of criminalization of prenatal drug use
must be left to the legislature); Tara-Nicholle B. DeLouth, Pregnant Drug Addicts as Child
Abusers: A South Carolina Ruling, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 96, 99-103 (1999) (arguing that
Whitner raises serious constitutional issues, including violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments as well as a woman’s privacy rights, and raises the public policy concerns of
selective enforcement and deterring drug addicts from seeking prenatal care).
74. In re Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d 366 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1998); State v. McKnight, 576
S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 2003). The case involved a stillborn baby girl whose autopsy revealed cocaine
in her system. Id. at 171. The court in McKnight extended the South Carolina homicide by child
abuse statute to an unborn child. Id. at 174.
75. Unborn Child, 683 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
76. Id. at 368-70.
77. Id. at 370. The court went on to find that “[p]rotection of the fetus, when the mother’s
constitutional privacy right is not involved, is not precluded and is in fact a recognized legitimate
state interest. In the instant matter, there is no maternal right to privacy involved as it concerns the
use of illegal drugs.” Id. Further, with regard to the question of statutory construction:
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By way of contrast, two state supreme courts since Whitner have declined
to extend child protection statutes to the fetus.78 In 2003, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court declined to call a fetus a “child” under the Oklahoma
Children’s Code and refused to allow the state to take temporary emergency
custody of the fetus.79 The court rejected an invitation to extend Oklahoma’s
recognition of the fetus as a “human being” under criminal and wrongful death
statutes to the Code, and held that “child” applies “only to those who are born,
living outside the womb of the mother.”80 Also in 2003, the Arkansas
Supreme Court faced a similar child custody situation in which the State
argued that a fetus who was in “imminent danger of severe maltreatment and
was dependent-neglected” due to its mother’s drug use be placed in state
custody.81 According to the State, the fetus was an individual under the
Arkansas Juvenile Code, and its mother’s right to privacy was “fairly and
constitutionally circumscribed” under Arkansas’ constitutional Amendment 68,
which established a public policy to protect the life of every unborn child.82
The court rejected this reasoning based on the plain and unambiguous language
of the statute’s definition of a juvenile as an individual from “birth to age
eighteen” 83 as well as on the purposes of the Juvenile Code.84
What conclusions may be drawn as to the rights being afforded fetuses in
cases of prenatal substance abuse? There is certainly no settled view among
the states. Although most states still have not passed laws making substance
abuse during pregnancy a separate crime,85 “[b]y 1992 criminal charges had
been brought against 167 pregnant women for delivering drugs to the fetus
through the umbilical cord,” and for prenatal child neglect, abuse or

. . . it would be incongruous to imagine the Family Court Act’s clear purpose being
anything other than to protect children, including unborn children, from harm. . . .
It is evident that the legislature, as well as other courts and other jurisdictions,
demonstrates intent to protect the unborn, not only with regard to property rights and tort
concerns, but with regard to the safety, physical integrity, and overall well being of the
unborn child.
Id. at 370, 371.
78. In re Unborn Child of Julie Starks, 18 P.3d 342 (Okla. 2001); Arkansas Dept. of Human
Services v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772 (Ark. 2003).
79. Unborn Child of Julie Starks, 18 P.3d at 348.
80. Id. at 345-46. The court looked to other Oklahoma statutes to conclude that “[w]hen the
legislature intends to refer to a fetus or to a pregnant woman, it does so specifically.” Id. at 347.
81. Collier, 95 S.W.3d at 774.
82. Id. at 776.
83. Id. at 779.
84. Id. The purposes of the Code included, inter alia, providing “guidance, care, and
control, preferably in each juvenile’s own home,” “preserv[ing] and strengthen[ing] the juvenile’s
family ties,” and considering the juvenile’s health and safety when “determining whether or not to
remove the juvenile from the custody of his or her parents.” Id.
85. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 52–53.
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manslaughter when the pregnancy ended in the birth of a stillborn baby.86
Further, “at least thirty-four [states] have prosecuted women for ‘fetal abuse’
since 1985” under the same types of statutes.87 According to one institute, as
of January 1, 2004, thirteen states considered substance abuse during
pregnancy as child abuse under civil child welfare statutes, and three
considered it grounds for civil commitment.88 According to Rachel Roth,
between 1973 and 1992 two-thirds of the states passed legislation specifically
geared toward women’s drug and alcohol abuse during pregnancy.89 In
addition, the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Whitner has been seen by
some as a tacit delegation of the matter to the states, thereby legitimizing state
efforts to protect fetuses in this area if they so choose.90 According to
Schroedel, the Court probably will continue to grant wide latitude to the states
in extending rights to the fetus without overturning Roe, which will probably
lead to greater fetal rights in civil law and “enormous disparities in the rights
accorded the fetus in different states and across policy areas.”91 Thus, some
states have decided to extend rights to fetuses in this area and efforts to
prosecute substance-abusing mothers for harm to their fetuses show no signs of
abating. Even in states that have not yet granted rights to fetuses, the question
promises to remain before state courts and legislatures for the foreseeable
future.
b.

Guardianship Appointments in Prenatal Substance Abuse Cases

There is very little case law in which the issue of pregnant mothers’
substance abuse arises in combination with the issue of a guardianship
appointment, and in the few cases that mention guardians, there is virtually no
analysis of the issue. In a 1988 Ohio appellate case, a pregnant woman
petitioned the court to issue a writ of prohibition ordering the respondent court
“to cease the exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction over her in a dependency
and neglect action.”92 The respondent court appointed a guardian ad litem for
the unborn child, and the court sustained a motion to intervene filed by the

86. DANIELS, supra note 5, at 2. Prosecution under the “delivery of drugs to a minor
theory,” which argues that the delivery occurs through the umbilical cord in the second after birth
prior to the cord being cut, has been largely unsuccessful. James R. Schueller, The Use of
Cocaine by Pregnant Women: Child Abuse or Choice?, 25 J. LEGIS. 163, 168 (1999).
87. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 53.
88. Alan Guttmacher Institute, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, available at
http://www.agi-usa.org/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2004).
89. ROTH, supra note 43, at 163.
90. See, e.g., Tolliver, supra note 73, at 403.
91. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 167.
92. Cox v. Court of Common Pleas, 537 N.E.2d 721, 722 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988).
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guardian.93 The appellate court made no mention of the propriety or
impropriety of this appointment.
In 1997, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered whether an unborn child
could be placed in protective custody under the state’s Children’s Code when
its mother was abusing illegal drugs.94 In concluding on statutory construction
grounds that a fetus was not a “child” under the Code, the court quoted
extensively from an exchange at oral argument between the court appointed
guardian ad litem and one of the appellate justices. It ultimately decline[d]
“the guardian ad litem’s invitation to ‘take on this burden’ to fill the legislative
void” with regard to fetal protection.95
In 1999, an Ohio appellate court upheld a trial court’s determination that a
mother’s prenatal cocaine abuse could constitute child abuse when the child
was born with cocaine in his system.96 The court pointed out that while Roe
denied personhood to fetuses under the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not
“eliminate the interest of the State in protecting a viable fetus.”97 In addition,
the mother argued that the fetus was not a proper ward for the appointment of a
guardian because the state guardianship statute authorized an appointment for a
“child” (not a fetus) and also allowed the court to provide emergency medical
treatment for the child if necessary, which could not logically apply to a
fetus.98 The court responded by stating “[w]e are not compelled to set
precedence leaving unprotected similarly drug-exposed infants solely on the
grounds that portions of the available statutory protections are logistically
feasible only after the time of birth.”99 In the face of very little instruction
from the guardianship cases, is it or is it not proper for a court to appoint
guardians to protect fetal rights in prenatal substance abuse court proceedings?
c.

Guardians for Fetuses?

Given the lack of a prevailing rule on guardianship appointments, the
analysis must proceed by considering when, if ever, general rules of
guardianship appointments are applicable to fetuses. First, once a state has
determined by legislation or by court decision that the fetus is a “person” or
“child,” generally or under a specific child abuse/neglect statute, guardianship
statutes that mandate appointments for minor children apply equally to fetuses.
In the absence of a guardianship statute, the court’s parens patriae duty to
protect a legal person triggers its inherent power to appoint a guardian for that
93. Id.
94. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Wis. 1997).
95. Id. at 739-740.
96. In re Baby Boy Blackshear, No. 99CA00018, 1999 WL 770788, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 7, 1999).
97. Id. at *2.
98. Id. at *5.
99. Id.
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purpose. Susan Goldberg concedes as much, observing that, if in cases where
the issue of guardianship was not reached but the court granted personhood to
the fetus, “the case [had] come before the court while the pregnancy was
ongoing, the court could have appointed a guardian ad litem for the fetus.”100
It would be incongruous for a state to grant a fetus legal personhood and then
refuse to offer the protection that status necessitates in a court proceeding. Of
course, the objection that granting legal personhood to the fetus even in nonabortion contexts is a constitutional violation under Roe remains.101 However,
as several courts have pointed out and as the Supreme Court’s denial of
certiorari in Whitner indicates, determinations of personhood outside the
abortion context have been left to the states and are not facially
unconstitutional when they do not infringe upon a woman’s right to
abortion.102 Moreover, as Whitner noted, prenatal substance abuse is not a
constitutionally protected interest.103 Thus, if states are within constitutional
bounds in extending rights to fetuses in this area, the appointment of a
guardian to protect those rights is necessarily within constitutional bounds.
Therefore, in a state such as Missouri, where a general statute grants “human
being” status to fetuses for the purposes of all laws, as well as in states such as
South Carolina, where such status has been granted for the purposes of specific
statutes, any court proceeding involving the fetus that does not implicate the
right to abortion or some other constitutional right of the mother requires the

100. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 525.
101. Ronald Dworkin, who staunchly supports Roe, suggests that states can protect the life of
a fetus in a variety of ways—including declarations of personhood—so long as those protections
do not “curtail [another’s] constitutional rights.” Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights:
Whether and How Roe Should be Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381, 400 (1992). He writes, “[i]f
a fetus is not part of the constitutional population, under the national constitutional arrangement,
then states have no power to overrule that national arrangement by themselves declaring that
fetuses have rights competitive with the constitutional rights of pregnant women.” Id. at 401.
Dworkin also suggests that the fetus’s rights deserve greater consideration when the mother’s
prenatal activity threatens damage that will follow the fetus beyond birth. “But if a woman
smokes during pregnancy, someone will later exist whose interests will have been seriously
damages by her behavior.” Id. at 405.
102. See Parness & Pritchard, supra note 6. “[T]he [Roe] Court’s position can be summarized
as treating the unborn not as persons in the whole sense, while recognizing that the unborn can be
treated as persons in many contexts.” Id. at 261. The authors contend that some post-Roe
decisions incorrectly denied personhood to fetuses in the context of third-party harm to fetuses
and that “[e]ven some laws prohibiting actions taken by the mother against the unborn are
presumably unaffected [by Roe], e.g., third trimester abortions or neglect of the unborn where
abortion is not the mother’s goal.” Id. at 267.
103. See also Schueller, supra note 86, at 175-78. “While the right to an abortion, post-Roe,
is a fundamental right, the use of illegal drugs such as cocaine does not rise to the level of a
protected liberty interest.” Id. at 176.
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appointment of a guardian for the fetus in order to protect the fetus’s
interests.104
Second, could an appointment be proper when the state has yet to consider
the issue of the personhood or has already determined that the fetus is not a
person in general or for purposes of the statute at issue? The use of guardians
in cases that have decided against a declaration of legal personhood is an
instructive place to start. In the recent Arkansas Supreme Court case that
decided against protecting a fetus under its Juvenile Code, the court
nonetheless made significant use of the testimony and findings of a courtappointed special advocate.105 The trial court based its findings in part on the
testimony of the child advocate and heard arguments from the advocate that
the supreme court subsequently relied upon.106 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
also refused to grant the fetus legal personhood but made similar use of the
testimony of a court appointed guardian in refusing to protect the fetus.107 Of
course, the fact that an appellate court relied upon testimony presented at the
trial court is not notable. The important point is that neither of these state
supreme courts noted anything improper about the use of these guardians, even
though they refused to recognize the fetus as a person.
The fact that these courts did allow guardian appointments still does not
answer the question of whether they ought to have allowed them. The answer
104. The Missouri statute reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being;
...
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to
acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights,
privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state,
subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof
by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes
and constitution of this state. . . .
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a
woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or
by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.
MO. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.
The United States Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989), passed on deciding the constitutionality of the language of the statute, but left much
power to the state to decide its applicability. The Court found that “Roe v. Wade ‘implies no
limitation on the authority of a State to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over
abortion.’” Id. at 506 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)). “We think the extent to
which the preamble’s language might be used to interpret other state statutes or regulations is
something that only the courts of Missouri can definitively decide.” Id.
105. Arkansas Dept. of Human Services v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 772, 773 (Ark. 2003). The
court also referred to her as a “child advocate representative.” Id. at 775.
106. Id. at 773, 775.
107. State ex rel. Angela M.W. v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 739-40. (Wis. 1997).
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to this question is found in the fact that the limited historical use of courtappointed guardians for fetuses did not depend upon the legal personhood of
the ward, but rather on the existence of a fetus’s legal interest before the court.
Well before the idea of assigning fetuses legal personhood, Blackstone saw
that appointing a guardian was appropriate to protect the interests of a fetus.
Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every
individual; and it begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to
stir in the mother’s womb. . .
An infant in ventre sa mere, or in the mother’s womb, is supposed in law to be
born for many purposes. It is capable of having a legacy, or a surrender of a
copyhold estate, made to it. It may have a guardian assigned to it; and it is
enabled to have an estate limited to its use, and to take afterwards by such
limitation, as if it were then actually born. And in this point the civil law
agrees with ours.108

Moreover, one historian has noted that the absence of juridical personhood is
actually one of the reasons in favor of appointing a guardian because without a
guardian the legal non-person has no means of protecting its legal interests.109
The Roe Court also noted the use of guardians ad litem in property proceedings
well before legal personhood had been extended to fetuses in any area of
law.110 The argument is not that, because the fetus has enjoyed a substantive
property interest in the past, it should now enjoy substantive rights against its
mother based on an analogy of those rights to property rights. Rather,
notwithstanding a refusal to extend legal personhood to fetuses, courts have
recognized that a fetus can have legally significant interests. Given the
possibility that a court proceeding will affect those interests, it is incumbent
upon the court to protect them.111 Such rights are sometimes referred to as the
rights of a “future person” that include a “right to begin life with a sound mind

108. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 117-18 (emphasis added).
109. MACKAY, supra note 25, at 13.
110. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
111. The important distinction between the fetal property interest and an interest in protection
from prenatal substance abuse is that the former does not conflict with any right of the mother and
the latter potentially does. However, as Whitner noted, though the protection of the fetus in these
cases creates a conflict, it does not create a constitutionally impermissible conflict because there
is no constitutional right to use illegal substances. Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C.
1997). In any case, see the following textual paragraph for my argument that the guardian cannot
properly be considered the cause of any constitutional conflict even if one does exist.
It is also true that one purpose of the recognition of these property rights was to protect
the wishes of the benefactor who had died. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. However,
again, regardless of the justification, the point in using the property example here is not to
compare the substantive rights, but simply to show that the protective function of a guardian does
not depend upon the full legal personhood of its ward.
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and body, and the right not to be harmed.”112 As an alternative justification,
the appointment of a guardian ad litem vindicates the state’s substantial interest
in the outcome of cases involving the significant social problem of drugaddicted babies. Some courts have been explicit in using this state interest
rationale to justify extending certain statutes to protect fetuses.113 A guardian
for the fetus plays a vital role in protecting this interest by presenting evidence,
making arguments, and assuring a full hearing on the issue at hand.114
Therefore, the presence of the fetus’s protectible future interest and the State’s
interest in the problem of prenatal drug abuse both justify the appointment of a
guardian, whether or not the state has recognized the fetus as a legal person.
Third, even if there is a protectable interest before the court, Goldberg
argues that the appointment of the guardian itself is an unconstitutional
invasion of privacy as it “would force a woman to justify her conduct to
another individual, potentially compelling her to divulge intimate and private
details of her life.”115 She argues that the State interest in a fetus as part of the
anatomy of the pregnant woman does not justify such an intrusion into the
personal physical autonomy and privacy rights of a mother.116 The problem
with Goldberg’s argument is that its proper target is the underlying substantive
right that the fetus has been given or the interest that the court is considering
rather than the guardian appointment. Concluding that the guardian is the
cause of these intrusions is to assign to the guardian a power it does not have.
If there is a problem of intrusion, the problem is with the substantive law that
gives rise to the court proceeding in the first place and dictates the extent to
which the court must delve into the pregnant mother’s privacy in order to
follow and correctly apply the law.
If the substantive law is not
unconstitutional, then the role of the guardian as an officer of the court is not,
in itself, an unconstitutional violation of privacy.117
Finally, Goldberg raises the concern that because a guardian cannot
possibly ascertain the “best interests” of a fetus, the guardian’s advocacy will
be based on “subjective notions of what constitutes appropriate behavior.”118
She asserts “[i]t would be extremely difficult at best for the guardian to
112. DEBORAH MATHIEU, PREVENTING PRENATAL HARM: SHOULD THE STATE INTERVENE?
38-39 (2d ed. 1996); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing early tort case
language affirming the right of in utero protection for the unborn child).
113. See, e.g., In re Danielle Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985).
114. Cases involving a mother’s substance abuse not only involve the issue of convicting the
mother of abuse or neglect, but often involve the question of termination of parental rights upon
birth. Such a determination will always be particularly fact intensive and require the court to take
into account many factors in determining whether to terminate parental rights.
115. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 534.
116. Id. at 533.
117. Even the courts that have refused to allow the terms “child” or “person” to extend to
fetuses have done so on statutory construction grounds rather than constitutional grounds.
118. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 535.
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ascertain what the ‘best interests’ of the fetus . . . would be in these
circumstances.”119 If this argument succeeds in defeating guardianship
appointments for fetuses, it would also defeat guardianship appointments for
incompetent adults who have not, prior to their incompetence, made known
their wishes. A guardian’s job is to ascertain, based on all the available
evidence, what the best interests of its ward are. That this function may pose a
significant challenge is hardly reason to deny the appointment in the first place.
For these reasons, the appointment of a guardian ad litem in court proceedings
involving a mother’s prenatal substance abuse is a proper and necessary
function of the court’s duty to protect the interests and rights before it.
2.

Fetal Rights In Medical Treatment Cases

a.

Is There a Fetal Right?

A second area of non-abortion related fetal rights is the medical treatment
of mothers for the sake of their fetuses. Physicians and hospitals “increasingly
resort” to the courts in order to compel treatment of pregnant women for this
purpose.120 Between 1973 and 1992, courts in twenty-five states granted court
orders to force pregnant women to undergo medical procedures for the benefit
of the fetus.121 Hospitals often petition courts for the orders, due in large part
to the medical establishment’s increasing imputation of medical “personality”
to the fetus itself, which engenders a “second patient” approach to treating the
fetus.122 This approach creates a balancing of rights between the fetus and the
mother when the fetus is in need of medical treatment.123
A number of cases considering this issue also discuss guardianship
appointments. The following overview of the case law will include both cases
that discuss fetal rights but do not consider guardianships and those that
discuss those rights along with guardianship appointments in medical treatment
situations. The issue came before the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1964
when a Jehovah’s Witness refused blood transfusions for religious reasons.124

119. Id. at 536.
120. April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical
Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563, 564 (2002). According to Rachel Roth, one California
obstetrician claims that he obtained forty-nine out of the fifty court orders he sought for cesarean
section surgeries for non-consenting pregnant women which, if accurate, exceeds all published
accounts of forced cesareans in law and medical journals. ROTH, supra note 43, at 95.
121. ROTH, supra note 43, at 95.
122. Id. at 105.
123. Id. at 106. Some argue that such an approach is improper because it ignores women’s
free exercise of religion rights (in cases involving refusal on religious grounds) and/or ignores a
woman’s constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. See Cherry, supra note 120, at 588-93.
124. Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 537-38 (N.J.
1964).
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The plaintiff hospital sought authority to give the transfusions, if they should
be necessary to save the life of the mother or her unborn, quick child.125 The
New Jersey Supreme Court granted the hospital’s request because it was
“satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law’s protection” and
remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to appoint a special
guardian for the unborn child.126 In 1981, a hospital petitioned a Georgia court
to allow its physicians to perform a cesarean section and administer blood
transfusions to save the life of an unborn viable child and the mother.127 The
court concluded that the unborn child had a legal right to the court’s protection
and authorized the hospital to administer “all medical procedures deemed
necessary by the attending physician to preserve the life of [the] defendant’s
unborn child.”128 A day later the Georgia Department of Human Resources
petitioned the juvenile court for temporary custody of the unborn child, at
which point the court appointed counsel for the parents and the unborn child—
to represent “the interests of the unborn child.”129 The court granted temporary
custody to the Georgia Department of Human Resources, giving it authority to
make all decisions pertaining to the birth of the child. It did so on the grounds
that the intrusion into the life of the mother was outweighed by the “duty of the
State to protect a living, unborn human being from meeting his or her death
before being given the opportunity to live.”130
125. Id. Doctors believed there was a “probability” that the mother would hemorrhage
severely at some point during the pregnancy, which would lead to the death of both her and the
fetus. Id. at 538.
126. Id. The case did not offer any analysis of this appointment.
127. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga. 1981) (per
curiam). The examining physician found that there was a 99% certainty that the child would not
survive a vaginal delivery, a 50% chance that the mother would not survive, and that both would
have an almost 100% chance of survival with a cesarean section. Id.
128. Id. The court also noted that an abortion of a viable fetus would be a criminal offense in
Georgia, and that, under Roe, a viable child has the right to the protection of the State. Id.
129. Id. at 459. As is common in many fetal representation cases as well as in cases involving
questions of fetal rights generally, the court used both a State’s interest rationale for protecting
the unborn child’s rights and a seemingly distinct fetal rights language to justify appointing
representation for the fetus. Id.
130. Id. at 460. A fuller excerpt from the court’s order is as follows:
. . . Should said sonogram indicate to the attending physician that the complete placenta
privia is still blocking the child’s passage into this world, Jessie Mae Jefferson, is Ordered
to submit to a Caesarean section and related procedures considered necessary by the
attending physician to sustain the life of this child.
The Court finds that the State has an interest in the life of this unborn, living human
being. The Court finds that the intrusion involved into the life of Jessie Mae Jefferson and
her husband, John W. Jefferson, is outweighed by the duty of the State to protect a living,
unborn human being from meeting his or her death before being given the opportunity to
live. Id.
In a concurrence, one of the justices pointed out that the power of the court to order a competent
adult to submit to surgery is “exceedingly limited” but that in this instance, the unborn child’s
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In 1985, a New York court, faced with a pregnant woman in imminent
danger of death who had refused blood transfusions on religious grounds, held
that the hospital could give her the transfusions over her objection.131 The
court noted that it would not interfere if the woman’s life were the only one
involved, but that it “must consider the life of the unborn fetus.”132 The court
noted that though the fetus was not viable, in a non-abortion context the state
“has a highly significant interest in protecting the life of a mid-term fetus,
which outweighs the patient’s right to refuse a blood transfusion on religious
grounds” and, therefore, “the fetus can be regarded as a human being, to whom
the court stands in parens patriae, and whom the court has an obligation to
protect.”133
In 1999, a United States District Court in Florida upheld a state court’s
order compelling a pregnant woman to submit to a cesarean section.134 The
court recognized the important constitutional interests at stake,135 but asserted
that because of the risk to the fetus, “the scope of Ms. Pemberton’s personal
constitutional rights in this situation . . . clearly did not outweigh the interests
of the State of Florida in preserving the life of the unborn child.”136 Thus, the
order compelling the cesarean section was proper.
By contrast, other courts have refused to hold that a fetus’s rights outweigh
a mother’s right to refuse medical treatment. In 1983 the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts reversed a trial court ruling compelling a pregnant
woman to have a surgical procedure to prevent a miscarriage.137 The court left
open the possibility that in certain instances the State interest might be
sufficient to justify such an intrusion for the benefit of the child but concluded
that the record in the case at bar did not show “circumstances so compelling as
right to live outweighed the right of the mother to refuse the surgery. Id. (Hill, J., concurring). In
a separate concurrence, another justice highlighted the fact that there was “no less burdensome
alternative for preserving the life of [the] fully developed fetus than requiring [the] surgery,”
because the risk to the fetus and the mother would be minimal as compared to the almost certain
death of the fetus and significant risk to the mother if the surgery was not performed. Id. at 461
(Smith, J., concurring).
131. In re Application of Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985). See
also Crouse Irving Mem’l Hosp., Inc., v. Paddock 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985)
(holding that the hospital and attending physicians were entitled to give blood transfusions to
baby and mother subsequent to the baby’s birth over mother’s religious objections).
132. Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d. at 899.
133. Id. at 900.
134. Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp.2d 1247 (N.D. Fla.
1999).
135. Id. at 1251. Ms. Pemberton asserted violations of her “right to bodily integrity, [ ] right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment, and a right to make important personal [ ] decisions
regarding the bearing of children without undue governmental interference.” Id.
136. Id.
137. Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (Mass. 1983). The procedure involved suturing the
cervix so that it would “hold” the pregnancy. Id. at 396.
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to justify curtailing the wife’s constitutional rights.”138 The trial court had
appointed a guardian ad litem for the fetus, but beyond mentioning the fact, the
court did not indicate its view of the propriety of the appointment.139
In 1990, the Court of Appeals of New York rejected a hospital’s
application for an order authorizing blood transfusions over the objections of a
woman who had just given birth by cesarean section.140 The court held that
there was no countervailing interest to outweigh the right of a competent adult
“to determine the course of [his or] her own [medical] treatment.”141 However,
the court noted that an identified state interest may be sufficient to override this
right and, in the appropriate case, the courts must weigh “the interests of the
individual against the interest asserted on behalf of the State to strike an
appropriate balance.”142 Also in 1990, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that “in virtually all cases [involving a pregnant mother’s
decision to receive medical treatment] the question of what is to be done is to
be decided by the patient—the pregnant woman—on behalf of herself and the
fetus.”143 The case involved a pregnant woman, A.C., who was near death
with cancer, and her twenty-six week old fetus. The lower court ordered a
cesarean section delivery, but shortly thereafter both the baby and mother
died.144 The court rested its decision to reverse the lower court on its inability
to tell from the record whether A.C. was competent to make the decision to
allow the cesarean section.145
We have no reason to believe that, if competent, A.C. would or would not have
refused consent to a cesarean. We hold, however, that without a competent
refusal . . . it was error for the trial court to proceed to a balancing analysis,
weighing the rights of A.C. against the interests of the state.146

In 1994, an Illinois appellate court denied a petition to force a competent
pregnant woman to undergo a cesarean section for the benefit of her fetus but
138. Id. at 397. More specifically, there were:
no findings, based on expert testimony, describing the operative procedure, stating the
nature of any risks to the wife and to the unborn child, or setting forth whether the
operation is merely desirable or is believed to be necessary as a life-saving procedure.
We have no showing of the degree of likelihood that the pregnancy will be carried to term
without the operation.
Id.
139. Id. at 395-96.
140. Fosmire v. Nicoleau, 551 N.E.2d 77 (N.Y. 1990).
141. Id. at 84.
142. Id. at 81.
143. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 (D.C. 1990).
144. Id. at 1241.
145. Id. at 1247.
146. Id. The court also noted that overriding a woman’s objection to medical treatment poses
the problem of “driv[ing] women at high risk of complications during pregnancy and childbirth
out of the health care system to avoid coerced treatment.” Id. at 1248.
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did not comment on the fact that the juvenile court below had appointed a
guardian.147 In so holding, the appellate court concluded that Illinois courts
should not engage in a balancing of the rights of the viable fetus and the rights
of a competent woman to refuse medical care.148 A woman’s choice to refuse
such invasive surgery “must be honored, even in circumstances where the
choice may be harmful to her fetus”149 and “[t]he potential impact upon the
fetus is not legally relevant.”150 The court indicated the possibility that
relatively non-invasive and risk-free procedures might require a different
conclusion, but it did not rule on that issue.151
Finally, three years later, an Illinois appellate court faced the question of
whether the State’s interest in the potential life of a fetus (as opposed to the
interests of the fetus itself) may be weighed against the woman’s decision to
refuse medical treatment.152 The medical situation involved a pregnant
woman’s seriously low hemoglobin levels that, in one doctor’s opinion, put the
woman and her fetus’s chances of survival at five percent if not corrected by a
blood transfusion.153 The court “appoint[ed] the public guardian of Cook
County, over his [own] objection, to represent the fetus.”154 After “balancing
the mother’s right to refuse medical treatment against the State’s substantial
interest in the viable fetus,” the court held that on the facts of this case “the
State may not override a pregnant woman’s competent treatment decision,

147. In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
148. Id. at 330.
149. Id. The court based its decision on the general right of every competent individual to
refuse medical treatment under Illinois common law, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and under the religious liberty protection of both the Illinois and U.S. constitutions.
Id. at 330-331.
150. Id. at 332. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily on a 1988 Illinois
Supreme Court decision dealing with unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries in which “the
court strongly suggested that there can be no consistent and objective legal standard by which to
judge a woman’s actions during pregnancy” and in which the court “explicitly rejected the view
that the woman’s rights can be subordinated to fetal rights.” Id. (citing Stallman v. Youngquist,
531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988)).
151. Id. at 333. In addition, the court rejected the argument that such a situation was
analogous to the state’s ability under Roe to proscribe abortion due to its compelling interest in
the potential life of a viable fetus. It reasoned, “[t]he fact that the state may prohibit post-viability
pregnancy terminations does not translate into the proposition that the state may intrude upon the
woman’s right to remain free from unwanted physical invasion of her person when she chooses to
carry her pregnancy to term.” Id. at 334.
152. In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 398 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
153. Id. at 399.
154. Id. The trial court subsequently appointed the hospital administrator as temporary
custodian of the fetus, with the right to consent to blood transfusions for the mother upon the
advice of a physician. Id. at 400. Darlene Brown, the mother, was given six units of blood over
the course of two days. When she resisted the transfusion, she was forced to comply with the
decision of the temporary custodian. Id.
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including refusal of recommended invasive medical procedures, to potentially
save the life of the viable fetus.”155 The court then distinguished this proper
balancing of the State’s interest in potential life and the mother’s rights from a
balancing of the ostensible rights of the fetus and the mother’s rights, which
would be improper.156 Because the case involved the mother’s rights vis-à-vis
the State’s interest, rather than the fetus’s rights, the “asserted legal interests
did not require” a guardian to be appointed for the fetus, and the circuit court
had, therefore, erred in the appointment.157
b.

Guardians for Fetuses?

Probably more so than with prenatal substance abuse, the court decisions
on forced medical treatment indicate no clear trend regarding the extent that
courts will recognize a fetal interest and no clear view on the appointment of
guardians. There has been much criticism of forced medical treatment, and
some writers see medical intervention for the sake of the fetus as “subjugation
of one human being to another.”158 Rachel Roth opposes the practice in part
because many situations involve doctors and hospitals in effect railroading
courts into approving emergency medical procedures that are not truly
necessary for the health of mother or fetus.159 Roth’s objection to coercive
tactics has merit, and the extent to which Roth is right at least raises questions
with regard to how such decisions are reached and executed.
With regard to whether there is a fetal right to be balanced against the
mother’s right, and hence one deserving of a guardian’s protection, at least
three things are clear even in the midst of the disparate court decisions. First,
all courts recognize that a competent adult has a significant right to refuse
medical treatment. Second, all courts acknowledge that this right is qualified
rather than absolute and must at times give way to other interests—sometimes
described as the State’s interest and sometimes described as the fetus’s interest.
Third, all courts acknowledge, explicitly or implicitly, that this determination
requires a careful factual inquiry as to the medical situation involved, the
seriousness of the proposed procedure, and the risks of the procedure to the
health of the mother and the fetus in order to reach a conclusion as to which
interest(s) outweighs the other.160 Each case discussed above embraced a

155. Id. at 405.
156. Id. at 406.
157. In re Fetus Brown, 689 N.E.2d at 406.
158. Cheryl E. Amana, Maternal-Fetal Conflict: A Call For Humanism and Consciousness In
a Time of Crisis, 3 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 351, 369 (1992).
159. ROTH, supra note 43, at 89-107. Here Roth presents persuasive evidence that sometimes
these cases do involve coercion. Id.
160. Even cases that do not consider the fetus’s rights “legally relevant” allow for balancing
between the State’s interest and the mother’s interest (albeit with some indication that a State’s
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balancing of competing interests as the appropriate analytical approach to
resolution of the issue of forced medical treatment. As with prenatal substance
abuse, opposition to or support of medical treatment for the benefit of fetuses
does not change this balancing and the procedural process that accompanies it.
It is the fact of the balancing itself that weighs in favor of the appointment of a
guardian for the fetus, whether the interests being balanced are attributable to
the fetus or to the State.
When the interest at stake is described as the State’s rather than the fetus’s,
the functional capacity of the guardian is the same as if the interest were
granted to the fetus. While a guardian is most often directly protective of the
rights of the ward, a second recognized function of a guardian is to protect the
interest of the state.161 Thus, In re Fetus Brown’s conclusion that a guardian
was inappropriate because the State’s “asserted legal interests did not require”
the appointment is incorrect.162 As I will argue in more detail below in Section
III.C, because protection of the State’s interest in such proceedings is
dependent on some form of direct protection of the fetus itself, the fetal
guardian as the protector of the State’s interest is, at least in a formal sense, an
appropriate role. Therefore, even in those jurisdictions, such as Illinois, that
regard a balancing of fetal rights and a mother’s rights as improper, a State
interest triggers the balancing of interests that requires the protection of a
guardian.
Finally, the arguments advanced in Section I.B(1)(c) in favor of fetal
guardians in prenatal substance abuse cases, even in the absence of a state
declaration of fetal personhood and in the absence of statutory authorization of
the appointment, apply equally to the medical treatment cases. The argument
advanced in the same section distinguishing the propriety of the guardianship
appointment from the antecedent question of the propriety of the underlying
interest applies here as well. In non-abortion related court proceedings, when a
fetus’s interests are before the court, the appointment of a guardian is the
necessary and proper mechanism for the protection of those interests.
III. ABORTION
Because states cannot, under current law, extend legal personhood and its
attendant rights and interests to the fetus when a mother’s right to abortion is at
stake, a guardianship appointment in such cases cannot be justified by the need
for protection of substantive rights and interests of the fetus. This section will
discuss the appropriate basis for defending guardianship appointments in
certain abortion-related court proceedings.
interest can rarely outweigh the mother’s). In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1994).
161. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
162. In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
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Pre-Roe v. Wade

Throughout the history of the abortion question, the issue of fetal
“personhood” has been important to varying degrees. Early Western
philosophers and theologians debated the exact time of “ensoulment”—the
moment when a person’s soul entered the body—in order to establish a marker
for when a fetus obtained the status of a human being, and later considered
“quickening”—when movement in the womb is detectable—as the proper
demarcation.163 Far from being academic considerations, such moral beliefs
had a significant impact on British common law and later on American
abortion law.164 From the early colonial period to the mid-twentieth century,
American laws generally prohibited abortion. It was not until efforts in the
mid-twentieth century to reform and liberalize abortion laws that there was a
widespread focus in America on the fetus as a distinct life as the justification
for opposing abortion.165 A 1962 case involving the efforts of Sherrie
Finkbine, a popular television host, to obtain an abortion pushed the question
of fetal personhood into the public consciousness and became a flashpoint
between those in favor of abortion reform and those opposed.166 “‘The
fundamental disagreement about whether or not an embryo represented a ‘real’
person or merely a potential person, a disagreement that had existed beneath
the surface for at least a hundred years, was finally forced into the open by the
Finkbine case.”167 For the next decade efforts at loosening abortion
restrictions met with some success through legislative means.168 Soon
thereafter, the pro-choice movement turned its attention to challenging the
constitutionality of abortion bans in the courts, culminating in the 7-2 decision

163. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 17. For example, Pythagoras and Hippocrates opposed
abortion at any point during pregnancy based upon the belief that the soul formed at conception.
Id. By contrast, Aristotle thought that ensoulment did not occur until the “animal” phase of
human development which occurred forty days after conception for males and eighty days after
conception for females. Thus, Aristotle supported abortion only before ensoulment had occurred.
Id. at 17-18. Plato went even further in his support of abortion and suggested that the State could
demand abortion for women over forty years old. Id. at 18.
164. Id. at 20. During the mid-seventeenth century, postquickening abortion was a crime in
all the colonies, and some localities had laws making it difficult to obtain abortion at any stage of
pregnancy. Id.
165. Id. at 38. The term “right to life” was used as early as 1963. Id. For a helpful, more
detailed look at the historical development of abortion law through Roe, see id. at 16-40.
166. Id. at 37. The situation involved the host’s ingestion of an anti-nausea drug,
thalidomide, that was found a couple of months later to be the cause of severe birth defects
around the world. A hospital scheduled an abortion, only to cancel it at the last minute because of
the negative publicity it had received. Id.
167. Id. (quoting KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 80
(1984)).
168. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 38. For example, by 1970 four states had repealed their
abortion bans and legalized abortion. Id.
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in Roe v. Wade overturning and declaring unconstitutional a Texas ban on
abortion.169 Roe, of course, decided the personhood question in the negative,
but it did so in a way that began the legal wrangling over what protection, if
any, the state may exercise on behalf of the fetus in the face of the mother’s
right to abortion.170
B.

Roe and Casey
1.

Roe v. Wade

Even as it granted the abortion right to women, for the purposes of this
Comment, Roe is most significant for the way in which it qualified and placed
certain limitations upon abortion as well. The Court reasoned that a person’s
right to personal liberty “is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy” but rejected the argument that such
a right “is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at
whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone
chooses.”171 Thus, the right of personal privacy, which includes abortion, is a
qualified right that “must be considered against important state interests in its
regulation . . . . and . . . at some point the state interests as to protection of
health, medical standards, and prenatal life, become dominant.”172 In
balancing these interests, the Court explained the point at which the State has a
compelling interest in fetal life as follows:
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life,
the ‘compelling’ point is at viability. This is so because the fetus then
presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.
State regulation protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and
biological justifications. If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after

169. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
170. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 44-45.
171. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
172. Id. at 154-55. The reason that the Court could speak of such a balancing was that it
rejected the argument that a fetus is a person under the Fourteenth Amendment with a guaranteed
right to life. Id. at 157-58. While this Comment will argue that guardianships ought to be
allowed in certain abortion contexts notwithstanding this determination of personhood, it is
interesting to note that much of the opposition to the recognition of fetal rights in non-abortion
areas of the law is based upon the Roe Court’s assertion that “[i]f this suggestion of personhood is
established, the appellant’s case, of course, collapses.” Id. at 156-57. Abortion advocates
recognize that expansion of personhood to fetuses in non-abortion contexts makes it difficult to
ignore the question of personhood in the abortion context, and some have argued, following Roe’s
lead, that the future of abortion rights hinges on the question of personhood. See, e.g., Wagner,
supra note 45. In the context of guardianships for fetuses, the ACLU recently has argued in a
brief that a guardian for a fetus should not be allowed because of this lack of personhood.
Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al. at 5-11, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004) (5D03-1921).
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viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.173

The Court concluded its analysis by stating that its holding “is consistent with
the relative weights of the respective interests involved” and “leaves the State
free to place increasing restrictions on abortion as the period of pregnancy
lengthens, so long as those restrictions are tailored to the recognized state
interests.”174 Thus, the Roe decision, while firmly entrenching the right of a
woman to choose abortion, affirmed the State’s right to regulate the decision at
certain points of the pregnancy. As Schroedel notes, in the abortion arena, Roe
began the balancing act between the woman and the fetus.175
2.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey

Nearly 20 years after Roe, Planned Parenthood v. Casey considered the
constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, as
amended in 1988 and 1989.176 The Court began its opinion by reaffirming the
three parts of the essential holding of Roe,177 reaffirming Roe’s placement of
the abortion decision within a woman’s fundamental individual liberty
interest,178 and justifying its affirmation in part on the importance of stare

173. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
174. Id. at 165. Schroedel calls the decision “an uneasy compromise between competing
rights” that “presented the Court with the problem of balancing one value . . . against another.”
SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 42. She goes on to say that this balancing of interests:
changed the conception of maternal-fetal relations. Until Roe, the legal system supported
the biological unity of woman and fetus and viewed their interests as identical. Even
when courts had found some degree of legal personhood in the fetus . . . they had assumed
that the interests of the woman and fetus at least coincided. In Roe, however, the Court’s
trimester framework established a precedent that viewed the interests of mother and fetus
as adversarial.
Id. at 44.
175. SCHROEDEL, supra note 2, at 44-45.
176. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). For a recent and unequivocal
criticism of the decision, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All
Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003). Paulsen argues that “[i]f the human embryo . . . is
morally entitled to be treated as a human being . . . then the regime created in Roe and
dramatically reaffirmed in Casey creates an essentially unrestricted substantive legal right of
some human beings to kill . . . other human beings. Id. at 996-97.
177. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. As stated by the Casey Court, those parts are: (1) a woman has a
“right to choose to have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference
from the State. Before viability, the State’s interests are not strong enough to support a
prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle to the woman’s effective right
to elect [abortion]”; (2) the State has power to restrict abortion after viability, “if the law contains
exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the woman’s life or health”; (3) “[T]he State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the health of the woman and the
life of the fetus that may become a child.” Id.
178. Id. at 846-53.
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decisis.179 However, in affirming Roe, the Court also acknowledged that some
of Roe’s “factual assumptions” involving the “scheme of time limits on the
realization of competing interests” were no longer valid.180 One of the most
significant changes wrought by Casey was its emphasis on and articulation of
the “important and legitimate” State interest in potential life prior to viability.
The Court began by asserting that, even in the earliest stages of pregnancy, the
State may adopt rules “designed to encourage [the mother] to know that there
are philosophic and social arguments of great weight that can be brought to
bear in favor of continuing the pregnancy to full term” as well as rules
requiring full divulgence of information about adoption options.181 Thus,
“measures aimed at ensuring that a woman’s choice contemplates the
consequences for the fetus do not necessarily interfere” with her right to
choose an abortion, and “we abandon the trimester framework as a rigid
prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal
life.”182 The Court recognized that laws that make a right more difficult to
exercise are not “ipso facto, an infringement of that right” and that a law
“which serves a valid purpose, one not designed to strike at the right itself” and
also has the “incidental effect” of making an abortion more difficult to obtain,
is not invalid.183 Thus, only when a regulation imposes an “undue burden” on

179. Id. at 854-69. For pointed criticism of the stare decisis justification, see Paul Benjamin
Linton, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight From Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 15 (1993). Linton argues that the Court’s heavy reliance on stare decisis
“is seriously undermined by its near total abandonment of Roe.” Id. at 34. Among other aspects
in which Casey differs from Roe, Linton points out the following:
Roe identified governmental interests in preserving maternal health and protecting the
“potentiality of human life,” which interests become “compelling” at various stages of
pregnancy, whereas Casey downgrades these interests to “legitimate” and “substantial.”
Roe held that regulations limiting the exercise of the right of abortion had to be “narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake;” Casey holds that such
regulation, if otherwise valid, need only be “reasonably related” to those interests. Roe
effectively employed the “strict scrutiny” standard of review; Casey substitutes the
“undue burden” standard.
Id.
180. Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
181. Id. at 872.
182. Id. (emphasis added). In dissent, Justice Blackmun disagrees that the State can have an
interest in a pre-viable fetus: “The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal
development; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus cannot survive separate from
the woman and cannot reasonably and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests
distinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman.” Id. at 932-33 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 873-74.
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the woman’s decision is the State prohibited from enacting it during the previability stage of pregnancy.184
The Court went on to attempt a definition of “undue burden” and in doing
so paved the way for the ongoing contentiousness surrounding the extent to
which the State may intervene in pre-viability abortion decisions. In general,
“[a] finding of an undue burden is a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path
of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.”185 The State’s
regulation must endeavor to inform rather than hinder the woman’s choice,186
and, as a “guiding principle[]” regulations “which do no more than create a
structural mechanism by which the State . . . may express profound respect for
the life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial obstacle to the
woman’s exercise of the right to choose.”187 The Court summarized its
“controlling principles” by saying that State “[m]easures designed to advance
this interest [in potential life] should not be invalidated if their purpose is to
persuade the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.”188
In applying these principles to the case before it, the Casey Court upheld
the medical emergency provision, the informed consent requirement, and the
parental consent provisions of the Pennsylvania statute.189 In upholding the
informed consent portion of the statute, which required the physician to
provide the woman with certain pre-determined information regarding the
abortion,190 the Court recognized that such information “furthers the legitimate

184. Id. at 874. For a helpful brief history of the Court’s use of the undue burden standard
prior to Casey, see Valerie J. Pacer, Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard—Is It A Lost Cause?
The Undue Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 296-305
(1995).
185. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877. In dissent, Justice Stevens says “[a] burden may be ‘undue’
either because [it] is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational justification.” Id. at 920
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
186. Id. at 877. Put another way, “a statute which, while furthering the interest in potential
life or some other valid state interest, has the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of
a woman’s choice cannot be considered a permissible means of serving its legitimate ends.” Id.
187. Id. A further guiding principle is that “[r]egulations designed to foster the health of a
woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.” Id. at 878.
188. Id. at 837. Justice Stevens, in dissent, is critical of allowing the State to persuade a
woman to chose childbirth over abortion, arguing that “Decisional autonomy must limit the
State’s power to inject into a woman’s most personal deliberations its own views of what is
best . . . . [W]e have upheld regulations of abortion that are not efforts to sway or direct a
woman’s choice, but rather are efforts to enhance the deliberative quality of that decision.” Id. at
916 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 879-99.
190. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881. The statute requires that a woman certify in writing that at least
twenty-four hours before the abortion the physician informs the woman of the nature and health
risks of the procedure, the probable gestational age of the fetus, the availability of materials
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[State] purpose of reducing the risk that a woman may elect an abortion, only
to discover later, with devastating psychological consequences, that her
decision was not fully informed.”191 The Court further allowed the State to
require doctors to inform the woman of available materials explaining effects
of abortion on the fetus, “even when those consequences have no direct
relation to her health.”192 The Court also upheld the twenty-four hour waiting
period element of the informed consent provision because even though the
waiting period might impose a particular burden on some women, “[a]
particular burden is not of necessity a substantial obstacle.”193
The spousal notification provision of the statute was the only portion of the
statute that did not survive the Court’s scrutiny.194 The district court findings
included data on the prevalence of physical and psychological abuse of women
at the hands of their husbands, including the fact that “[m]ere notification of
pregnancy is frequently a flashpoint for battering and violence within the
family.”195 In addition, the primary reason that married women do not notify
their husbands when they are seeking an abortion is that they are experiencing
marital difficulties which often involve violence.196 Thus, the spousal
notification requirement “does not merely make abortions a little more
difficult . . . to obtain;” instead, a significant number of women “are likely to
be deterred from procuring an abortion as surely as if the Commonwealth had
outlawed abortion in all cases.”197
C. “Undue Burden” After Casey
The question subsequent to Casey’s articulation of the undue burden
standard is exactly what state action constitutes an undue, and therefore
unconstitutional, burden on a woman’s right to choose an abortion. As for
guardianship appointments, courts have not analyzed the issue under the Casey
standard, and indeed all of the subsequent litigation in the area has focused on
statutes directly regulating abortion itself. Therefore, an initial question may
describing the fetus, information about medical assistance for childbirth, child support, and
alternatives to abortion. Id.
191. Id. at 882.
192. Id.
We conclude . . . that informed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that all
considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant . . . . [When there is] a
reasonable measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to
choose childbirth over abortion. This requirement cannot be considered a substantial
obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is no undue burden.
Id. at 883.
193. Id. at 886-87.
194. Id. at 888.
195. Casey, 505 U.S. at 889.
196. Id. at 892.
197. Id. at 893-94.
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be whether the Casey standard is an appropriate one for analyzing the question
of guardianship appointments in abortion contexts because (1) a guardianship
appointment is not an abortion statute or direct regulation as such, and (2) one
might argue that a guardian’s role is as protector of the interests of the ward
and not as a protector of the State’s interest. As for the latter objection, one of
the recognized purposes of guardianship appointments is the protection of a
legitimate State interest.198 As one historian points out, the guardian is the
“actual” protector on behalf of the “metaphysical entity” of the State. 199 As a
metaphysical entity the State is only able to protect its interests indirectly
through secondary means, and the main secondary means available in abortion
related court proceedings is a guardian for the fetus.200 Because protection of
the State’s interest in a court proceeding is dependent on protection of the fetus
itself, the role of a guardian for the fetus is, at least in a formal sense, an
appropriate role—though the question of whether the role constitutes an undue
burden remains.201 As to the former objection, there is no indication in Casey
or any of the subsequent undue burden cases that the standard applies only to
statutory regulations or laws per se. The function of a guardian in an abortion
context is “regulatory” in nature because the appointment affects a woman’s
abortion decision, so it properly falls within the Casey standard.202 For these
reasons, the Casey standard is appropriate for analyzing the propriety of
guardians for pre-viable fetuses.
Only two types of regulations have “flunked” the undue burden test: partial
birth abortion statutes and the spousal consent statute discussed in Casey
itself.203 In their rulings, courts have emphasized Casey’s view that a
regulation which has only the “‘incidental effect of making it more difficult or
more expensive to procure an abortion cannot be enough to invalidate it’”204
and that “laws that regulate, not abortion itself, but ancillary issues . . . do not
affect fundamental rights unless the ancillary rule creates an undue burden on
the underlying right.”205

198. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 30 and accompanying text
200. The court itself, in the form of the judge, cannot be the protector because the function of
the court is to be an impartial arbiter rather than an advocate of any particular interest.
201. See infra Part III.D for a discussion of the contention that the State does not need a
guardian to protect its interests because existing law fulfills that role.
202. See Silverstein, supra note 12 (applying the Casey undue burden standard to
guardianship appointments for fetuses in judicial bypass proceedings for minors seeking
abortions).
203. Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 691 (7th Cir.
2002).
204. Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, 222 F.3d 157, 166-67 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992)).
205. Newman, 305 F.3d at 688.
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Partial-Birth Abortion Statutes

Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Stenberg v. Carhart,206 in the area of
partial birth abortion, the Sixth Circuit struck down an Ohio statute because it
“inhibit[ed] the vast majority of second trimester abortions [and] would clearly
have the effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
the pre-viability abortion.”207 In Stenberg, using almost identical reasoning,
the Court struck down a Nebraska statute outlawing partial birth abortion
because it “impose[d] an undue burden on a woman’s ability to choose” D & E
abortions, the most common second trimester abortion procedure.208 In her
concurrence, Justice O’Connor made clear that the regulation was an undue
burden because it proscribed “the most commonly used method for performing
previability second trimester abortions.”209 The common theme in striking
down these partial birth abortion statutes is the significant and direct
proscription of common legal abortion procedures.
2.

Informed Consent Statutes

Following this theme of requiring substantial proscription of abortion to
invalidate a statute, courts have upheld the constitutionality of several other
types of statutes. In Karlin v. Foust, the Seventh Circuit upheld the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin informed consent statute.210 The court noted
that a regulation may be designed to ensure that a woman’s choice
contemplates the consequences for the fetus, may express a profound respect
for the life of the unborn, and may be designed to persuade a woman to choose

206. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
207. Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 201 (6th Cir. 1997). For other
pre-Stenberg decisions following this reasoning exactly, see also Planned Parenthood of Greater
Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Little Rock Family Planning Services, P.A. v.
Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999).
208. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 930 (internal quotations omitted).
209. Id. at 949 (O’Connor, J., concurring). See also Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d
127, 144-45 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that the statute was “so vague as to be easily construed to ban
even the safest, most common and readily available conventional pre- and post-viability abortion
procedures” and that physicians would be “chilled” from performing these common types of
abortions); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003) (upholding partial
birth abortion statute that did not restrict the most commonly used procedure for second trimester
abortions).
210. 188 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1999). The statute at issue prohibited abortion unless the woman
gave her voluntary and informed written consent. Id. at 454. To be voluntary, consent must be
given freely and without coercion. Id. To be informed, the woman must be provided two tiers of
information at least twenty-four hours before obtaining an abortion. Id. The first tier required a
physician to meet with the woman in person and orally provide statutorily prescribed information.
Id. The second tier required a qualified person other than a physician to orally provide to the
woman, in person at least twenty-four hours prior to the scheduled abortion, certain statutorily
prescribed information along with certain state-provided printed materials. Id.
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childbirth over abortion if it is reasonably related to that goal.211 Significant to
its analysis was that a pre-viability regulation by definition will burden a
woman’s ability to obtain an abortion to some degree and that this level of
interference from the state is constitutional.212 To be an undue burden “a
challenged state regulation must have a strong likelihood of preventing women
from obtaining abortions rather than merely making abortions more difficult to
obtain.”213
An important aspect of the Karlin court’s analysis dealt with the results of
a Mississippi study showing that a similar statute caused (1) an 11 to 13%
decrease in the number of Missisippi women undergoing reported abortions as
compared with expected levels; (2) a 25% decrease in the number of
Mississippi women obtaining abortions before reaching the nine-week point of
their pregnancies as compared with expected levels; and (3) a 17% increase in
the number of Mississippi women going out of state for abortions.214 The
plaintiffs’ expert testified that the Mississippi mandatory waiting period was
responsible for these results.215 In holding this evidence insufficient to support
an undue burden conclusion, the court said that the Mississippi study’s “most
significant shortcoming, however, is that it failed to adequately control for the
persuasive effect of the law.”216 The court continued:
Thus, to prove that an abortion regulation poses an undue burden on a woman
under Casey, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the number of
abortions declined after the passage of a state abortion regulation because that
result is entirely consistent with a state’s legitimate interest in persuading a
woman to carry her child to term. . . . [T]he district court found that [the
study] does not adequately explain the reason for the decline—whether the
drop in abortions is attributable to the persuasive effects of the law or the
difficulties in making two trips to an abortion facility.217

211. Id. at 479.
212. Id. Justice Scalia, in his Casey dissent, is critical of the undue burden standard because it
“may ultimately require the invalidation of each provision upheld today if it can be shown, on a
better record, that the State is too effectively ‘express[ing] a preference for childbirth over
abortion.’” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 992-93 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting the majority opinion). See also Silverstein supra note 12, at
108-10 (arguing that the undue burden standard is inadequate because of its unintelligible
“distinction between encouraging childbirth and hindering abortion”).
213. Karlin, 188 F.3d at 482. The court adds the further important specification that the
question is not whether the regulation would significantly restrict a majority of women seeking
abortion, but rather, whether the regulation would significantly restrict the group of women to
whom the regulation applies. Id. at 481.
214. Id. at 486.
215. Id. at 486-87.
216. Id. at 487.
217. Id. Put a slightly different way, “the Mississippi Study failed to prove that the drop in
abortions in Mississippi is causally attributable to any unconstitutional effect of that state’s
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Finally, the court concluded that the purpose of the statute was not
improper because there was no evidence that it was calculated to hinder rather
than inform a woman’s free choice.218 Further, the court averred that a statute
might be constitutional even if enacted with the purpose of interfering with a
woman’s right to abortion if it does not have the actual effect of interfering
with that right, so long as the regulation was reasonably related to the state’s
interest in promoting childbirth over abortion.219
3.

Parental Consent Statutes

Yet another area in which undue burden challenges have failed is parental
consent statutes. The Supreme Court, in its Bellotti decision of 1979,
established that while a minor has a right to an abortion, a minor’s decision is
“unique in many respects.”220 Specifically, there are three reasons the
“constitutional rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults: the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child
rearing.”221 Thus, states “validly may limit the freedom of children to choose
for themselves in the making of important, affirmative choices with potentially
serious consequences.”222 As a result, the Court allowed parental consent
statutes so long as they include a judicial bypass provision allowing a minor to
avoid the parental consent requirement in certain situations.223

mandatory waiting period.” Id. at 488. A more recent Seventh Circuit decision has reaffirmed
this holding on similar reasoning. In A Woman’s Choice-East Side Women’s Clinic v. Newman,
the court said that a decrease in abortion as a result of such a statute may show that “presenting
the information in person is critical to its persuasive effect” and that a similar statute may not
even have the same result in a different state. 305 F.3d 684, 690, 692 (7th Cir. 2002). The court
also said that an undue burden might exist if many women who strongly wanted an abortion have
been blocked by increased cost in time and money, but that it would not be an undue burden (and
is an equally plausible explanation for the decrease) if the decrease represents a percentage of all
women who are “on the fence between ending pregnancy and carrying the pregnancy to term, so
that even a modest cost tips the scales.” Id. at 691.
218. Karlin, 188 F.3d at 493.
219. Id. at 494-95 (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
[O]ur reading of Mazurek suggests that a state abortion regulation will survive an
impermissible purpose challenge if it is a reasonable measure designed to further the
state’s legitimate interest in protecting either the life of the fetus or the health of the
mother; provided that it cannot be shown that the legislature deliberately intended the
regulation to operate as a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions.
Id. at 494.
220. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
221. Id. at 634.
222. Id. at 635.
223. Id. at 643-44. The minor is entitled to a proceeding to show “either: (1) that she is
mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation with her
physician, independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this
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In its undue burden analysis of a North Carolina parental consent statute,
the Fourth Circuit found a preliminary injunction of the statute improper
because there was not a “clear showing of irreparable injury which is neither
remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.”224 The court also found a
lack of a causal link between the Act and the alleged injuries to minors, noting
that the delays in obtaining an abortion could be caused by the actions of
minors rather than by the provisions of the Act.225 The court observed that:
Merely recounting the trauma and risks involved in teen pregnancy . . . is not
sufficient to preliminarily enjoin enforcement of a parental consent statute . . . .
The Court agrees that young pregnant minors have a need for . . . support. . . .
But in no case have the Appellants tied these needs to a harm directly caused
by the Act.226

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit recognized that a State may not erect a
procedural hurdle designed simply to make it more difficult to obtain an
abortion. However, it held a requirement that a minor appeal a judicial bypass
decision within twenty-four hours was not an undue burden even though the
statute might pose some hardship for some women seeking an appeal.227 In
response to the dissent’s claim that some minors would be precluded from
effectively pursuing a judicial bypass, the majority said:
[E]very added procedure will necessarily cause some hardship, yet not every
procedural obstacle to an abortion creates an undue burden. In addition, any
procedure will, in conjunction with some conceivable set of circumstances,
prevent some minor from effectively pursuing a judicial bypass . . . . and the
fact that some minors will be practically precluded . . . from pursuing a judicial
bypass does not mean that the procedure is unconstitutional. 228

decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best interests.” The proceedings
must also insure the anonymity of the minor and proceed expeditiously. Id.
224. Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 264 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiffs argued that the Act posed an undue burden based on six different aspects of the Act,
including language dealing with expediency and various procedural requirements for the minor.
Id. at 258.
225. Id. at 265.
226. Id.
227. Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456, 462 (6th Cir. 1999).
Planned Parenthood argued that the provision impermissibly shifts the burden of acting
expeditiously to the pregnant minor. Id.
228. Id. at 463 n.3. For other examples of circuit court decisions dealing with parental
consent statutes, see Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 307 F.3d 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that
Arizona’s judicial bypass provision satisfied the Supreme Court requirements and was not an
undue burden); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452 (8th Cir. 1995)
(striking down a South Dakota abortion regulation because, inter alia, the parental notification
provision did not include a judicial bypass option); Barnes v. Mississippi, 992 F.2d 1335, 1340
(5th Cir. 1993) (upholding as constitutional a Mississippi statute’s parental consent requirement
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Additional Regulations

In addition to these three main areas of undue burden litigation, some
circuits have applied the analysis in other areas. For example, the Eighth
Circuit held constitutional a Missouri statute preventing abortion service
providers from receiving state family planning funds.229 The court said the
statute was “intended to effectuate the State’s constitutionally permissible
decision to favor childbirth over abortion, and any effects limiting women’s
access to abortion services are strictly incidental” and thus not an undue
burden.230 In Mazurek v. Armstrong, the Supreme Court upheld a Montana
statute restricting performance of abortions to licensed physicians.231 The
Court said even assuming that a legislative purpose to interfere with the right
to abortion without the effect of interfering could invalidate the law, there was
no basis for finding an illegitimate legislative purpose in this case.232
In Greenville Women’s Clinic v. Bryant, the Fourth Circuit upheld a South
Carolina statute establishing licensure and operational requirements for
physicians’ offices and medical clinics performing five or more first trimester
abortions per month.233 The court below found that the regulation served no
legitimate state interest, and even if it did, it constituted an undue burden
because of increased costs, delays in the ability to get abortions, decreased
availability of abortion clinics, increased travel distances to clinics, and
unlimited inspections of clinics and compromises to patient confidentiality.234
In reversing this decision, the court said a facial challenge to a statute can
succeed only based on expert predictions rather than on actual data as applied
to South Carolina patients.235 “Such anticipation, however, is generally not an
appropriate basis on which to strike down statutes and regulations.”236 The
court then concluded there was no evidence that the statute was an undue
burden, and “[o]nly when the increased cost of abortion is prohibitive,
essentially depriving women of the choice to have an abortion, has the Court
invalidated regulations because they impose financial burdens.”237 Finally, the
requiring the consent of two parents, even though the two-parent requirement would
“incrementally increase the burden on the minor’s exercise of her right to get an abortion”).
229. Planned Parenthood of Mid-Missouri and Eastern Kansas, Inc. v. Dempsey, 167 F.3d
458 (8th Cir. 1999).
230. Id. at 465.
231. 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
232. Id. at 972. “We do not assume unconstitutional legislative intent even when statutes
produce harmful results; much less do we assume it when the results are harmless.” Id. (citation
omitted).
233. 222 F.3d 157 (4th Cir. 2000).
234. Id. at 163.
235. Id. at 164.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 167. The estimated increase in cost as a result of the licensing requirements in this
case was $23-$75 per abortion. Id. at 170.
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court commented that Casey had replaced the Roe strict scrutiny standard with
the undue burden standard, which asks “not whether [the standard] serves a
compelling state interest, but whether it ‘serves a valid purpose.’”238
5.

Summary of Post-Casey Undue Burden Jurisprudence

One need only look to the courts’ language since Casey to see that the
undue burden test has not been favorable to abortion regulation challenges. In
the only two areas in which the courts have found an undue burden—partial
birth and spousal consent statutes—the records were replete with evidence that
the statute would cause large-scale prevention of legal abortions. In all
decisions upholding the regulations, terms such as “proscription,”
“prevention,” and “significant” reverberate as the effects required before a
regulation will be declared unconstitutional. Courts have required a significant
showing of significant and direct prevention of abortion to strike down a
regulation and have upheld statutes causing some financial and logistical
obstacles to abortion. Courts also have distinguished “ancillary” regulations
from regulations that directly impact access to abortion, indicating that
ancillary regulations are constitutional absent a clear showing of undue burden
so long as they bear a rational relation to the state’s interest in protecting
potential life. We now turn to the application of these principles to fetal
guardian appointments in court proceedings involving minors seeking judicial
bypasses and incompetent mothers whose decision regarding the pregnancy is
in the hands of a guardian.
D. Guardians in Abortion-Related Court Proceedings
1.

Minors Seeking Judicial Bypass of Parental Consent Requirements

a.

Case Law

The Florida Supreme Court considered the question of a guardian in the
context of a minor seeking a judicial bypass for a first trimester abortion.239
238. Bryant, 222 F.3d at 173 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874
(1992)). See also Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Casey: “Roe decided that a woman had a
fundamental right to an abortion. The joint opinion rejects that view. Roe decided that abortion
regulations were to be subjected to ‘strict scrutiny’ and could be justified only in the light of
‘compelling state interests.’ The joint opinion rejects that view.” Casey, 505 U.S. at 954
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973)).
239. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1989). For criticism of the judicial bypass
system, see Jennifer Blasdell, Mother, May I?: Ramifications For Parental Involvement Laws For
Minors Seeking Abortion Services, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 288-93 (2002)
(arguing that bypass proceedings burden minors’ health and compromise minors’ rights to
confidential medical care); see also J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives:
Listening to Teens Who Make the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 18
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The guardian ad litem for the fetus argued at the trial court hearing that the
judicial bypass portion of the statute was unconstitutionally vague and parental
consent must therefore be required in every instance where a minor seeks an
abortion.240 The trial court declared the bypass provision unconstitutionally
vague, but did so in favor of the minor and granted the bypass.241 The
guardian ad litem then filed several unsuccessful motions to block the abortion,
the minor obtained an abortion, and the guardian ad litem appealed to the
Florida Supreme Court.242 With no rationale and no citation to precedent, the
court summarily condemned the appointment of the guardian for the fetus:
“Preliminarily, we find that the appointment of a guardian ad litem for the
fetus was clearly improper.”243
The Alabama Supreme Court gave no analysis of the propriety of
appointing a guardian in general, limiting its discussion to whether a nonviable
fetus has a right to appeal a judicial bypass order through its guardian ad
litem.244 As Helen Silverstein points out, the court’s opinion rejected the right
of the guardian to appeal but did not reject or confirm the decision of the trial
court to appoint the guardian in the first place.245 According to Silverstein,
with four justices indicating that trial courts may appoint guardians ad litem in
waiver hearings and five justices remaining silent on the point, trial courts in
Alabama now have discretion to appoint guardians in these proceedings.246 In
concurrence and dissent, several justices took up the argument the majority had
refused to address, suggesting that the trial court did have the authority to
appoint a guardian under a court procedure rule requiring a guardian “when the
interest of an infant unborn or unconceived is before the court.”247 One justice

BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 173 (2003) (reporting that minors describe going to the bypass
hearing as “frightening, nerve-wracking, and humiliating”).
240. T.W., 551 So. 2d at 1189.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 1190.
244. In re Anonymous, 720 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. 1998) (holding that the guardian ad litem
did not have statutory authority to appeal an order granting the waiver of parental consent to have
an abortion because the legislature did not provide such a right).
245. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 85.
246. Id. at 86. In fact, Silverstein’s research shows that at least two judges in Alabama trial
courts appoint such guardians as a matter of routine. Id. Also of note in this case was the
guardian’s tactics in examining the minor at the hearing. The guardian questioned her about her
familiarity with certain Bible scripture and asked whether she was aware that, by choosing
abortion, she would be “snuffing out” the life of her child. Id. at 70. In addition, the guardian
used words like “kill” to describe abortion and the waiver lasted nearly four hours (compared to a
normal proceeding that ordinarily lasts 30 minutes). Id. at 82-83. Because Silverstein sees this
line of questioning as a somewhat isolated type of activity by a guardian, she still concludes that
the appointments pass constitutional muster. Id. at 88-89.
247. Anonymous, 720 So. 2d at 499 n.2 (quoting ALA. R. CIV. P. 17(c)).
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argued that because Alabama required such an appointment under the rule in
divorce proceedings, a similar interpretation should apply here.248
b.

Guardians for Fetuses?

Helena Silverstein’s analysis of this issue in Alabama courts is the only
significant treatment to date and provides a touchstone for this analysis.
Silverstein argues that appointing guardians ad litem in judicial bypass
proceedings does pass constitutional muster, but she views this conclusion as
“reveal[ing] serious shortcomings in Casey.”249 Under Casey, Silverstein
admits, a regulation will be an undue burden only if it has “the purpose or
effect of stopping women from obtaining safe abortions. That women would
confront considerable challenges . . . is not sufficient to find the measure
constitutionally flawed.”250 Further, “[w]e can fairly surmise, then, that the
joint opinion establishes that states may hinder abortion, at least insofar as the
encouragement of childbirth constitutes a hindrance to abortion . . . . This,
then, is what undue burden means: Regulations that fall short of stopping
abortion and do not entail health risks are permissible, regardless of their
otherwise burdensome qualities.”251
Silverstein, then, though opposing guardianship appointments, finds them
constitutionally permissible under Casey. This conclusion undoubtedly is
supported by the post-Casey cases discussed above. The guardian has no
power to prevent, proscribe, or make the procurement of abortion for minors
effectively illegal. Even the most anti-abortion guardian under the supervision
of the most anti-abortion judge, such as the one in Alabama that Silverstein
discusses, can attempt only to persuade the minor to choose childbirth over
abortion, a purpose explicitly condoned in Casey and its progeny.252 The

248. Id. at 502 (Hooper, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 108-10. Interestingly, Silverstein suggests that the same
constitutional argument justifying guardians for fetuses in judicial bypass proceedings
theoretically justifies requiring a competent adult woman to discuss her abortion decision with a
guardian who speaks for the fetus. In Silverstein’s view, such a requirement would certainly
“strik[e] at the heart of liberty,” but could be justified under the “permissive character” of the
undue burden standard. Id. at 108-10. “If states may, consistent with the undue burden test,
require that a woman—minor or adult—be questioned by an agent of the fetus, then there is
something fundamentally wrong with that test.” Id. at 110. The problem, in part, is the lack of a
principled distinction between encouraging childbirth and hindering abortion, and thus “the
notion of ‘substantial obstacle’ becomes a euphemism for those regulations that prevent abortion
or pose substantial health risks for women.” Id. A discussion of whether Silverstein is right
about this extension to adult women under Casey is outside of the scope of this Comment.
250. Id. at 96.
251. Id. at 96-97.
252. Silverstein reaches her conclusion on constitutionality even though some guardians have
used tactics that are improper in her view and even though the avowed aim of guardians who
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guardian as an officer of the court simply has no power to accomplish the
prevention of abortion required to fail the undue burden test.
Even if a guardian’s presence had the effect of hindering some minors
from succeeding in their judicial bypass efforts, regulations that merely cause
some hardship are not invalid.253 In fact, “every added procedure will
necessarily cause some hardship” and such hardship is rarely sufficient to
invalidate the regulation.254 Indeed, no such body of evidence exists to support
an undue burden conclusion with respect to guardians. Furthermore, as
evidenced in Karlin v. Foust and Memphis Planned Parenthood, Inc. v.
Sundquist, even a substantial decrease in the granting of judicial bypasses
would implicate guardian appointments only if there is an additional showing
that the decrease is causally related to an unconstitutional element of the
guardian’s activities. Without such a showing, the decrease may be causally
related to the constitutionally legitimate persuasive power of the guardian.255
In addition, even if a substantial number of courts began to deny judicial
bypasses and the decrease could be causally linked to the presence of the
guardian, a plaintiff still would have to show that a significant number of
minors were then unable to obtain an abortion through parental consent.
Denial of a judicial bypass is not denial of an abortion; it simply means
parental consent is required. Finally, if there is a decrease in minors seeking
judicial bypass in the first place, implicating the guardian in this decrease
would require evidence that minors’ knowledge of the presence of a guardian
in the proceeding was the cause of the chilling effect rather than some other
difficult element of teenage pregnancy.256
The arguments above indicate reasons why a successful constitutional
challenge to guardianship appointments would be nearly impossible to mount.
There is also a significant positive reason to appoint a guardian to protect the
State’s interest in potential life—to ensure that the laws promulgated by the
state’s legislature are administered fairly and impartially. In minor judicial
bypass proceedings, the State has passed a parental consent law allowing a
judicial bypass only on a specific, Supreme Court-mandated showing of the

represent fetuses is, through their questioning and calling of witnesses, to convince the minor to
carry the fetus to term. Id. at 88; see supra note 243.
253. Note as well language in cases that have even indicated that an improper purpose will
not sustain a challenge in the absence of an improper effect. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 494
(7th Cir. 1999).
254. Memphis Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, 175 F.3d 456, 463 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999).
255. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 180-93.
256. Manning v. Hunt, 119 F.3d 254, 265 (4th Cir. 1999) (noting that the trauma and risks
involved in teenage pregnancy are not sufficient to strike down a parental consent statute). See
Ehrlich, supra note 237, at 186-87 for a description of teen anxiety in facing bypass proceedings
without guardians. That this anxiety already exists would make a showing that a guardian was
the cause of a significant chilling effect very difficult.
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minor’s decision-making maturity or that the abortion is in the best interests of
the minor. This determination involves offering evidence and examining the
minor. A guardian’s role in challenging evidence, offering counter evidence
and examining the minor would aid the court in making a proper
determination. This ensures that the proceeding is not simply a rubber stamp
on the minor’s desire to avoid seeking parental consent. The appointment of a
guardian surely bears a rational relation to these goals of protecting the State’s
interest in the fetus and in the just administration of the laws of its legislature.
The appointment of a guardian for fetuses in this context does not pose an
undue burden on a minor’s right to choose an abortion. Further, it is a
legitimate mechanism to protect the State’s interest in the life of the fetus and
to encourage childbirth over abortion.
2.

Mentally Incompetent Mothers and the Abortion Choice

a.

Case law

The final section of this Comment will discuss the propriety of appointing
guardians in proceedings involving a mother’s alleged incompetence. In re
D.K. involved a schizophrenic woman who was pregnant with a non-viable
fetus.257 A court-appointed guardian for the fetus obtained a court order
restraining hospital personnel from treating the mother with medication
harmful to the fetus and restraining her from consenting to or requesting an
abortion.258 The guardian filed an additional suit seeking to declare D.K.
legally incompetent, but before a decision could be reached on the issue, D.K.
was discharged from the hospital.259 Immediately thereafter, D.K. moved to
dismiss the incompetency action and in doing so challenged the right of the
fetus to be represented and the standing of its guardian to file a complaint on
its behalf.260
In holding the appointment of the guardian for the fetus improper, the New
Jersey Superior Court found support in Roe for the proposition that “it is the
mother who controls the fetus, until viability occurs, not the reverse.”261 Thus,
the appointment of a guardian for a fetus, prior to viability, is improper
because “the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the
whole sense and . . . during the first trimester of pregnancy a decision may be
reached and effectuated to abort the fetus, free of any interference by the

257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
Id.

In re D.K., 497 A.2d 1298, 1300 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985).
Id.
Id. at 1301.
Id.
Id. at 1302. “If the mother is incompetent control must be exercised through a guardian.”
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state.”262 In addition, court rules provided for appointment of a guardian ad
litem for a minor, but not a fetus, and thus the appointment stood outside the
statutory authority of the court.263 Finally, the lower court lacked in personam
jurisdiction for the purpose of appointing a guardian because the fetus was not
a person.264
A New York appellate court considered the case of Nancy Klein, who was
seventeen weeks pregnant and a comatose patient in a hospital as a result of
brain damage.265 At the same time Klein’s husband applied to be her
temporary guardian, the court denied the petition of a stranger to be guardian
of the non-viable fetus.266 Echoing the reasoning in In re D.K., the appellate
court upheld the denial of the application for guardianship of the fetus
“because a non-viable fetus, i.e., one less than 24 weeks old, is not a legally
recognized ‘person’ for the purposes of proceedings such as these [and] [t]he
State has no compelling interest in the protection of the fetus prior to
viability.”267
A Florida appellate court considered the involuntary commitment of a
pregnant mother suffering from severe psychosis.268 The trial court had
appointed an attorney ad litem for the fetus, who favored termination of the
pregnancy because it would be in the best interest of the fetus and the
mother.269 The court sought authority to terminate the pregnancy and put on
evidence showing the severe effects of the psychosis and the danger that
normal childbirth would pose to the mother and child.270 The trial court
authorized termination of the pregnancy, but the appellate court reversed on
procedural grounds.271 The court did not comment on the propriety of
appointing a guardian for the fetus.
In re Jane A. considered whether, under the doctrine of substituted
judgment, a mentally incompetent person would choose to terminate her
eighteen-and-a-half week pregnancy.272 As an initial matter, the court of
appeals noted with approval that the Probate Court judge was “conscientious in
262. D.K., 497 A.2d at 1302 (quoting Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57, 58 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1977)) (internal quotations omitted) (also holding that the appointment of a guardian for
the fetus was improper).
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1303.
265. In re Klein, 538 N.Y.S.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Lefebvre v. N. Broward Hosp. Dist., 566 So. 2d 568, 569 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
Without lithium to control her psychosis, the mother was violent, abusive and uncontrollable and
that use of lithium would result in severe damage to the fetus. Id.
269. Id. at 570.
270. Id. at 569-70.
271. Id. at 570-71.
272. In re Jane A., 629 N.E.2d 1337, 1338 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
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appointing persons who would examine the question from various points of
view” including a guardian ad litem “‘to oppose a determination that [the
ward], if competent, would choose to have an abortion.’”273 Because there
would possibly be adverse consequences with both childbirth and abortion, the
trial court said “‘we cannot presuppose that [the ward], if competent, would
disregard the fetus as an important factor in her decision’. . .[thus] the ward’s
‘decision, if competent, would be not to consent to an abortion.’”274 After a
reexamination of the record revealed a significantly greater danger to the
mother if she proceeded with the pregnancy, the court of appeals reversed.
This led to the conclusion that were she competent, she would have chosen to
terminate her pregnancy.275
In the most recent case at the time of this writing, a Florida appellate court
held the appointment of a guardian for a viable fetus improper.276 The case
involved a twenty-two-year-old woman who was pregnant as a result of sexual
battery and was suffering from severe mental retardation, cerebral palsy,
autism and a seizure disorder.277 According to the court, the absence of the
term “fetus” in the state’s guardianship statute and the clear inclusion of the
term by the Florida legislature in statutes designed to protect fetuses meant the
statute did not extend to fetuses.278 In addition, the term “ward” in the Florida
statutes “means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed” and “[i]t
follows that a fetus must be considered a ‘person’ to be appointed a
guardian.”279 No Florida case or statute had ever determined the fetus to be a
person.280 Further, Florida law provided other safeguards to ensure that any
273. Id. at 1338 n.1 (citing In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d 712 (Mass. 1982)). In addition, the judge
appointed a temporary guardian with authority concerning medical issues, counsel for Jane, and a
guardian ad litem to investigate the substituted judgment question with respect to abortion. Id.
274. Id. at 1340.
275. Id. at 1340-41. Among the evidence that the appellate court considered was Jane’s
inconsistent testimony on whether she understood what her pregnancy meant and whether she
wanted it to continue. The court also considered expert testimony that continuing the pregnancy
could undo the progress Jane had made through years of behavioral therapy and that the
probability of harm would be “a thousand fold” greater if she proceeded with the pregnancy
instead of terminating it. Id. at 1340.
276. In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534, 539 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2004).
277. Id. at 536.
278. Id. at 538.
279. Id.
280. Id. In a concurrence continuing this discussion of the lack of personhood of the fetus, the
concurring justice makes extensive use of Roe’s requirement that state regulation of a
fundamental right is justified only by a compelling state interest. Id. at 541 (Orginger, J.,
concurring). This reasoning is inexplicable because even under Roe a state may proscribe
abortion after the third trimester without showing a compelling interest. Only the dissent
mentions Casey, arguing that the trial court was obligated to determine if the appointment of a
guardian for the fetus constituted an undue burden and that in this case it did not. Id. at 546
(Pleus, J., dissenting).
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decision in favor of abortion made by the mother’s guardian would not be
capricious or cavalier.281 By contrast, in the dissent’s view, the appointment of
a guardian would “greatly assist” the court in protecting its interest in the life
of the fetus, and “[w]ithout the appointment of a guardian . . . there will be an
inherent conflict of interest in the protection of the ward and the unborn
child.”282 The dissent said the denial of a guardian “nullified the only effective
mechanism and non-burdensome method by which the State can fulfill its
duty.”283
b.

Guardians for Fetuses?

Is it proper to appoint a guardian for a fetus in court proceedings involving
an incompetent mother’s “choice” about abortion? The first consideration is
whether the Florida appellate court and others before it are right when they
conclude that a guardian cannot be appointed for a fetus because statutes do
not specify fetuses as proper wards. As I have argued above, this argument is a
red herring in view of the court’s equitable power to appoint guardians.284
Similarly, the argument that lack of fetal personhood precludes the
appointment is belied by the strong State interest in protecting fetal life285 and
by the “rational relation” of a guardianship appointment as a means toward that
end.286 In the J.D.S. case, the ACLU of Florida contended that the State does
not need a guardian to protect its interests in a viable fetus because once a fetus
becomes viable Florida law already limits the availability of abortion for all
women.287 According to the brief, Florida law prohibits a woman from having
an abortion after the twenty-fourth week of pregnancy unless “‘termination of
pregnancy is necessary to save the life or preserve the health of the pregnant
woman’” and thus existing law already protects the State’s interest.288 The

281. J.D.S., 864 So. 2d at 539.
282. Id. at 546 (Pleus, J., dissenting).
283. Id.
284. See discussion supra Part I.
285. All of the cases other than J.D.S. that reject guardianship appointments for pre-viable
fetuses on non-personhood grounds did so prior to Casey’s articulation of the undue burden
standard.
286. In its brief, the ACLU argued that “As a threshold matter, Florida law only permits the
appointment of guardians for ‘persons.’ A fetus, however, is not a person under the guardianship
statutes.” Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al. at 3, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921). The brief makes the same lack of personhood argument
under the United States and Florida Constitutions. Id. at 11. See supra Part II.B.1.c for detailed
criticism of this argument.
287. Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al, at 18, J.D.S. (No. 5D03-1921). This
specific contention in the Florida case takes us outside the realm of undue burden analysis
momentarily because that standard governs only pre-viability regulations.
288. Id. at 19 (quoting FLA. STAT. ch. 390.0111(1)(a) (2003)).
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ACLU brief claims that the law applies no differently to J.D.S than to any
other woman in Florida.289
This argument fails because it does not recognize the fundamental
difference between the J.D.S. situation and the situation of any other woman in
Florida. The difference is that J.D.S. herself is not making the abortion
decision. Instead, a court-appointed guardian woman is making the decision
based on a determination of J.D.S’s best interests as ward under the law
proscribing abortions for viable fetuses except when the mother’s life or health
are in danger. In this context, the State has a clear interest to ensure that the
third-party decisionmaker for the incompetent woman properly assesses the
danger to the mother’s life and health, which is required in making the
determination. Such a third-party determination will involve examination of
the medical situation and the risks involved in abortion versus the risks
involved in carrying the pregnancy to term. To emphasize this point, one of
the amici curiae briefs filed in the J.D.S. case documents numerous procedural
violations that occurred in another Florida case that authorized the abortion of
a mentally incompetent woman’s fetus.290 The brief argues that the hearing of
evidence and the standard of review used by the judge to determine whether
the mother was at sufficient risk to authorize an abortion violated statutory
requirements. At the very least, a guardian for the fetus was necessary to
“ensure that testimony concerning the health and life risks of the mother
because of pregnancy are fully cross-examined to examine competency,
veracity and motive.”291 The laws proscribing abortion do not in themselves
ensure protection of the State’s interest when a third-party decisionmaker
makes the determination for the woman. Thus, a State needs a guardian to
protect its interest in the life of a viable fetus.
Is the appointment, then, an undue burden when pre-viable fetuses are
involved? As discussed in the preceding paragraph, the question raises slightly
different issues than those raised by minor judicial bypass appointments
because in these cases an incompetent woman cannot properly be said to make
the choice herself. Because of this, the analysis as to whether the guardian
properly informs the woman’s choice or is an improper substantial obstacle
under Casey is somewhat forced. Obviously, the guardian of an incompetent
woman faces a more difficult task in seeking an abortion if a guardian for the
fetus is present to protect the State’s interest. However, there is no evidence
that this added challenge would present the kind of preventative or proscriptive
bar to abortion that the undue burden jurisprudence requires for

289. Id. at 18-19. It is important to note that in the case of a viable fetus, the state may not
only regulate abortion under Casey but may even proscribe it.
290. Brief of Amici Curiae Florida Right to Life, Inc. et. al. at 5-10, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d
534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921).
291. Id. at 10.
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unconstitutionality. The guardian’s role as a structural mechanism to protect
the potential life of the fetus and even to exert persuasive power in favor of
childbirth falls within the allowable ways the State may vindicate its interest.
A guardian does not have the ultimate power to “make effectively illegal” the
specific abortion sought in a particular case, much less a significant number of
common abortion procedures for a significant number of women. In the case
of incompetent women, because there is no possibility of a chilling effect on a
substantial number within the group of women the regulation would impact,
the guardian could hardly be said to “strike at the heart” of the abortion choice.
Instead the appointment of a guardian is an “ancillary” regulation that is
designed to aid the court in considering the best interests of the fetus as a
means to protect the State interest in the fetus, and is not an undue burden on a
woman’s right to choose. Thus, while different standards and justifications
govern the decision in abortion and non-abortion contexts, the necessity of
balancing interests in both arenas requires the appointment of guardians for
fetuses.
III. CONCLUSION
The appointment of guardians for fetuses in court proceedings involving a
maternal-fetal conflict is an appropriate and necessary mechanism for
protection of fetal rights and State interests in non-abortion contexts and for
protection of the State’s interest in potential fetal life in abortion contexts. A
question that this Comment undoubtedly raises, but does not attempt to answer,
is whether under the logic of the argument such appointments could be
required whenever a competent woman pursues an abortion. Helena
Silverstein argues that the inadequacy of Casey “to intelligibly distinguish
between encouraging childbirth and hindering abortion” could lead to the
conclusion that may require a woman—minor or adult—to be questioned by an
agent of the fetus.292 While Silverstein may be right about this, I predict that
such a requirement would be found to be an undue burden under current law.
Be that as it may, the arguments advanced here are intentionally limited to the
types of court proceedings discussed throughout in an effort to advocate proper
application of the law in this area as currently written.
Although this Comment argues that the appointment of a guardian for a
fetus is not dependent upon statutory authorization, states should rewrite their
guardianship statutes to include fetuses in the types of cases discussed here.
Hopefully, the Comment has provided sufficient argument to support the

292. Silverstein, supra note 12, at 110; see also Renewed Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU et. al.
at 18, In re J.D.S., 864 So. 2d 534 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (No. 5D03-1921) (stating that
“[i]ndeed, if third parties are allowed to represent the fetus under these circumstances, there is no
logical reason they would not seek to do so in the case of a competent pregnant woman
considering an abortion or medical treatment detrimental to her fetus.”).
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legitimacy of such statutes. The appointment of guardians for fetuses is
responsive to the fact that states are increasingly recognizing fetal rights that
sometimes conflict with a mother’s rights, and that in such cases the fetuses’
rights must be heard and defended. In abortion cases, the State’s interest in
potential life must also be protected by the appointment of guardians. Under
current law, “the fundamental dilemma” certainly does remain the balancing of
the rights of the fetus and the rights of pregnant women. 293 So long as the law
creates space in which this balancing must occur, guardians for fetuses ought
to play a vital role in this process.
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